

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE *MARSHAL PLAN* AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

An overview of post-conflict reconstruction models and frameworks of the marshal plan and its relevance to Africa. More specifically the study aimed to provide an overview of PCR models and frameworks in Africa, analyze PCR models and frameworks in Africa and assess the Marshal Plan in relevance to Africa. The theoretical perspective of the study deals with a bottom-up approach to state formation where the underpinning theory is Hobbes' Consent Theory. The study utilized sources of historical/comparative data, and analytical techniques. In this study, the populations of interest were 7 Africa ambassadors based in Kenya and 4 humanitarian interventions selected for this study. The study used both secondary and primary data. Secondary data was obtained from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, the Central Banks of Africa, the World Bank, UNDP, The study utilized primary sources such as United Nations Resolutions, US Congressional hearings, and data from the

World Bank. These primary sources were supplemented by secondary sources, including books, periodical journals, newspapers, and relevant internet websites. Primary data will be collected using an interview guide (Appendix I). Contents analysis was used to analyze the data where the findings which emerged from the analysis were used to compile the report. The study finding raises the imperative for some kind of discretion and self-control on the part of different regimes, as well as a mechanism for imposing peer sanctions on deviant regimes and countries that aid the destabilization of other countries or engaged in acts that subvert the integrity of neighbouring states. According to the study findings it is clear that post-conflict in Africa has left in their wake a litany of problems that may be difficult to resolve, even in the long run, due to lack of capacity and resources.

Key Words: *Post-conflict reconstruction models and frameworks, marshal plan, Africa*

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

Elaiwu asserts that reconstruction is the rebuilding of both formal and informal institutions. This involves the restoration of physical infrastructure and amenities, minimal social services, and structural reform in the political, economic, and social and security sectors. The reconstruction procedure usually begins with rebuilding the government and political order. While parts of the preceding reconstruction models and framework may remain in place, the main goal of reconstruction is a main shift of the ideology and operations of the political structure.

The collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War melted globally the frozen peace, but also heated up a number of suppressed local tensions in various spots of the world.

Violence in particularly extreme forms spurred within and across state borders.¹In 1995, prolonged combats between the military forces of two or more governments, or between one government and at least one organised armed group with high number of battle-related deaths occurred within rather than between states.²In the context of the raising awareness about the global economic, socio-political, and technological interdependence, the transition into the dynamics of the ‘unbalanced’ world emphasised the need for new framework of international relations and policies. The direct involvement in local affairs became regarded as a security measure with an important peace-building and peace-preventing role.³

The challenge of building a lasting peace lies at the core of the development business and, more specifically, of the international financial institutions. Their institutional and intellectual foundations were established in the final years of World War II, as world leaders sought actively and consciously to reconstruct war-battered economies and to prevent future conflicts.⁴During the subsequent half-century, the end to conflicts in many parts of the world has seen a call on development institutions to move urgently to support the rebuilding of infrastructure and institutions and thus help cement the peace. These interventions have taken many forms, along a continuum ranging from classic emergency aid, generally directed at direct victims of violence, through the broad array of investment actions that merge into classic development finance operations per se.

Promoted as defending the values of democracy, human rights, and socio-economic development, the new agenda appeared to contradict the key principles of the United Nations philosophy laid out by the United Nations (UN) Charter.⁵The various perspectives, justifying the international interference with domestic issues, were still challenging the founding principles of the international order sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.⁶Nevertheless, following the leading example of the 1947 Marshal plan, the international post-conflict reconstruction agenda gained popularity in the Post-Cold War settings opening the

¹Elaigwu, J. (1996). “*African Security in Changing International Environment. Peace Keeping as a Security Strategy in Africa: Chad and Liberia as Case Studies*”. M. A. Vogt and L. S. Aminu. Enugu, Fourth Dimension Publishing Co. Ltd.1: 3-22.

²Hashim, A. (2005). *The Fallen State, Dissonance, Dictatorship and Death in Africa*. University Press of America, Inc., Lanham, Maryland.

³Barro, J. (1994) “Aid and Growth”, NBR Working Paper Series, paper No 4909, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge: October 1994

⁴Kiiza, L. (2008), “The relation between aid and economic Growth: What Aid Strategy Should the Government of Uganda Promote?”, in GRIPS, Diversity and Complementarity in Development aid: East Asian Lessons For African Growth, Published by the GRIPS Development Forum, February 2008.

⁵Little, R. (2008), “International Regiems” In Baylis John, *The Globalization of World Politics*, 4thed, Oxford University Press.

⁶Omorogbe, T. (2011), “A club of Incumbents? The African Union Coups D’état” *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* Vol. 44:123

floor for debates over the humanistic/humanitarian causes and the political-economic interests underlying the international engagement with local issues.

A flash-back on development aid timeline will create the understanding and dynamism that has characterised development aid. This is relevant for understanding the current development architecture. United States' Marshall Plan after the World War II (WWII) marks as important landmark of development aid. The earliest comprehensive policy framework called the Act for International Development was designed by the foreign minister, George C. Marshall in 1947 under the President Truman Regime (1945-1953).⁷ The Marshall Plan targeted European countries' economic reconstruction after the devastation of WWII. US' interest in strengthening Western European countries against the expansion of communism and ultimately also the benefits of reconstruction of free Europe for American businesses was not a hidden agenda.⁸ Donor interest and motives for aid has become central to development politics. Germany until the 1980s tied aid to security related motives whilst Great Britain and France had relatively altruistic and humanitarian motives due to their colonial affiliations to former colonies.⁹ The current development aid practices, across the world, have similar tendencies of tying aid to certain motives and priorities.

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peace building, which has to do with managing change.¹⁰ The nexus between development, peace and security has become the central focus of the international conflict management debate, and peace building is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which these peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law, human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level. These developments culminated, as the centrepiece of the UN reform proposals of the 2005 World Summit, in the establishment of the UN Peace building Commission. In Africa, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted a Post-Conflict Reconstruction Framework in 2005 and the AU adopted a Post-Conflict Reconstruction (PCR) and Development Policy in 2006.¹¹

The moral grounds of the PCR practices as mechanisms for promoting peace and development in war-affected areas can be challenged; but the phenomenon cannot be ignored

⁷Portmann, R. (2010), "*Legal Personality in International law*", Cambridge, Cambridge UP press

⁸Slaughter, M. (2004), "*International Law and International Relation Theory: Prospectus*" in Benvenisti, Eyal & Hirsh, Moshe, *The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical Perspectives*, Cambridge University Press.

⁹Udsholt, L. (1996), "*Danish Aid Policies for Poverty Reduction: From non Committal Statements to a more Strategic approach*". CDR Working Paper 96.7, Published By Centre for Development Research

¹⁰Adedeji, A. (2004). "*Comprehending and Mastering African Conflict*", Zed Books Ltd., London, England.

¹¹Lewis, I. & Mayall, J. (2005). *Africa. The New Interventionism 2001-2004: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Africa*. J. Mayall. Cambridge, University of Cambridge: 94-124.

as playing a key role for shaping the world today.¹² With a potential to change direction of events and developments in general, international intervention in local affairs goes beyond an isolated act of humanitarian assistance.¹³ Therefore, a set of well-planned and dutifully implemented programmes and activities are needed to meet the specific demands of any post-war environment and to overcome the negative effects of an experienced conflict. In this light, reconstruction agents are accountable for both the local and the global future.

STATEMENT OF THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

The issue of security challenges in Africa is one of the most interesting areas of study.¹⁴ Given the complex nature of the African political system as a whole, it is logical to understand and examine the complexities in light of the nature of post-colonial African statehood. Since independence Africa as a continent has been dragged into ever expanding inter- and intra-state conflicts surmounting to the extent of genocide and continuous human casualties; and Colonial and super power legacies perpetuate and seem to have worsened the condition of security, human welfare and development. In addition, there are Institutional weakness and resource constraints prevailing since the days of the OAU; economic stagnation and ever increasing level of poverty and the absence of democratization; and Global economic challenges undermine the bargaining powers of most African states.¹⁵

Defenders of the Marshall Plan have found it difficult to cope with this phenomenon of uniform growth. Most typically, the Marshall Plan is viewed as a series of nationwide aid and recovery schemes that can be analyzed independently.¹⁶ Thus, case studies are often presented which seek to pinpoint examples of Marshall Aid having helped to overcome strategic bottlenecks in a given national economy. Yet political historians have long adopted a radically different position. In their view, the Marshall Plan is to be regarded as a long-term unifying political strategy of the U.S. for European reconstruction along free market lines that centered around reintegrating West Germany's economy into the European division of labor.¹⁷ In order not to be locked into providing U.S. assistance to Europe indefinitely, it would re-establish the West German economy as the prime supplier of capital goods to Western Europe, thus rendering Marshall aid unnecessary in the medium term and closing the dollar gap in European trade with the U.S.

¹²Mohamed, S. (2004). *Africa The Missed Opportunities*, the United States Institute of Peace Press, Washington, D.C.

¹³Pugh, M. (2000), *Regeneration of War-Torn Societies*, St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y.

¹⁴Hanson, S. (2008). "Somalia's Transitional Government." Retrieved Nov. 2, 2009.

¹⁵Glickman, Harvey (1995) *Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa*. The African Studies Association Press, Atlanta, GA.

¹⁶Samatar, A. & Samatar, A. (2007). The Material Roots of the Suspended African State: Arguments for Africa. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25 (4): 660-90.

¹⁷Zartman, I. (2005). *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa*. New York, Oxford University Press.

The framework for discussing PCR has taken on important new dimensions in the period since 1989, in large measure as a result of the vast geopolitical shifts that have taken place.¹⁸ As the nature of conflicts has shifted, so have the challenges of PCR. The explosive demands for humanitarian aid (which consumes a rapidly rising share of funds going to development assistance), the disruptions of populations on all continents through refugee flows, and the cyclical trends of violent outbreaks in several regions of the world present a new set of problems to leaders in virtually all segments of the international community.¹⁹ The tasks of rebuilding battered nations, cementing reconciliation, and redirecting development to avert future conflicts are thus much more central challenges for the development institutions today than they were a decade ago.²⁰ An active international debate is underway that aims to enhance and clarify the roles of different institutions in these various activities and, overall, to find better formulas to build peace and help avoid recurrence or outbreaks of conflict.

Africa's economic development challenges, including establishing a sound PCR models and frameworks in the first instance, and moving aggressively to rebuild enfeebled public sector institutions, emerged clearly as priority issues for peace-making and peace-keeping as well as for longer-term economic development.²¹ The perils of postulating that peace came first and development thereafter emerged starkly from discussions. Some outside partners had tended to compartmentalize the issues, essentially relegating development issues including use of reconstruction models and frameworks to a post-conflict situation.²² Although PCR models and frameworks are at the center of war reconstruction, little had been written on this topic in recent times hence the need for this study.

GENERAL OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The overall objective of the study is to examine post-conflict reconstruction models and frameworks within the context of *Marshall Plan* and its relevance to Africa.

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES THE STUDY

1. Provide an overview of PCR models and frameworks in Africa;
2. Analyze PCR models and frameworks in Africa;
3. Assess the *Mashall Plan* and its relevance to Africa.

¹⁸Laitin, D. (2007). *Politics, Language and Thought: The Somali Experience*. Chicago, the University of Chicago Press.

¹⁹Karp, M. (2007). *The Economics of Trusteeship in Africa*. Boston: Boston University Press.

²⁰Glickman, Harvey (1995) *Ethnic Conflict and Democratization in Africa*. The African Studies Association Press, Atlanta, GA.

²¹ Whitfield, L. & Fraser A. (2009), "Aid and Sovereignty" in Whitfield, *The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors*, Oxford University Press, Oxford

²²Bouldha, J. (2001), *Peace Enforcement: the United Nations Experience in Congo, Africa, and Bosnia*. Praeger Publishers, WestPoint, CT

LITERATURE REVIEW

Stedman asserts that the memory of the Marshall Plan varies according to time and to social, political, and professional groups.²³ The Marshall Plan was not ignored by European people because of an intense propaganda and of course of its obvious usefulness. According to the United Nations Security Council many Europeans who were not anti-American resented the deep dependence of Europe vis-à-vis the United States, in a time of Cold War which drove them to adopt the point of view of the Atlantic and capitalist world.²⁴

According to Weir the memory of the Marshall Plan is selective. Senior civil servants remember now how certain decisions were taken, without a political or even economic view on the context.²⁵ Some of them speak mostly of the productivity missions. Few stress trade liberalization. They easily talk about EPU, but forgot the debates of OECD about liberal economy and controlled economy. According to Newman and Richmond the political choices have marked the memory of the Marshall Plan. Indeed, the nationalists, the communists, and the extreme left are resentful of the political dependence implied by American aid.²⁶ For some people, to be in favor of the Marshall Plan, 20 years after it, was seen as a denial of USSR. On the contrary the necessity of a temporary aid was accepted by the center-left and center-right, in spite of its disadvantages.²⁷

Uvin asserts that the Marshall Plan is wrongly considered as a rearmament plan and authors can write that the Marshall Plan was a victory of Atlanticism and a rejection of national independence.²⁸ It has no longer now the same importance after the fall of the Soviet block. But the Marshall Plan remains a powerful argument for building the Atlantic solidarity. The memory of the Marshall Plan is linked to Europe's entrance into the era of consumer society. The American presence in Europe through the Marshall Plan, military bases, high technology or even the social compromise from the New Deal, as well as anti-communism and decolonization, invited Europeans to a new world. However, that process could feed some anti-Americanism at the same time because of the threat

²³ Stedman, J. (1997). Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes. *International Security* 22 (2), 5-53.

²⁴ United Nations Security Council. (2007). Special Research Report No. 2 of 2007, on the Peacebuilding Commission, 5 October 2007, New York: United Nations.

²⁵ Weir, E. (2006). *Conflict and Compromise: UN Integrated Missions and the Humanitarian Imperative*, KAIPTC Monograph No. 4, May 2006.

²⁶ Newman, E. & Richmond, O. (2006). *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers during Conflict Resolution*. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.

²⁷ Minear, L. & Chellia, U. (1992). *UN Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis*. Providence: Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies.

²⁸ Uvin, P. (1999). *The Influence of Aid in Situations of Violent Conflict: A Synthesis and Commentary on the Lessons Learned from Case Studies on the Limit and Scope of the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations*. DAC, Informal Task Force on Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation, OECD, Paris

of destruction of Europeans' own, historical values.²⁹ Indeed the French opponents to the Marshall Plan were proud of their little national homeland with its gastronomic, economic, cultural or liberal arts traditions without seeing how the war had already globalized the issues. Difficulties were made worse by the shock of the encounter with American society, which had already started, but accelerated in a period of extreme weakness for Europe.³⁰

Stedman asserts that public opinion usually recognizes that the Marshall Plan contributed a great deal to the Trente glorieuses the 30 glorious years of growth and prosperity which followed the liberation of France.³¹ Historians are divided over the impact of the Marshall Plan because Germany took off before benefiting from the Marshall aid, while France used the Marshall funds to finance the modernization plan of Jean Monnet. Moreover, the relevance of the Marshall Plan for development of any country is perceived differently in each nation according to its economic, moral, human, and financial condition. Historians have shown that the success of the ERP was linked to the previous success of a given country in the field of innovation capacities, production capability, or trade. And it is the case of the Western European countries.³² The Marshall plan invited the OECD countries to co-operate, a great innovation compared to the pre-war period. In fact it contributed to the division between Western and Eastern Europe.

According Secretary-General of the United Nations today the Marshall Plan is now used to warn public opinion against an impending, unusually disastrous situation demanding immediate solution. It is a great honor for the Marshall Plan.³³ Here one is not talking about the historic Marshall Plan anymore, but about an icon representing a success story celebrated by history. The sociologist has to analyze what the Marshall Plan means in the mind of those who call for a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe (1991), for Africa (always), for the French banlieues (2005), for French universities, or for the reduction of the European technological gap. Using this historical reference without any connection with the real Marshall Plan means the will to act quickly, with efficiency and with significant financial transfers, in order to reach a quick success.³⁴

²⁹Walraven, K. (2009). *Dreams of Power: The role of the Organization of African Unity in the Politics of Africa 1963-1993*. Leiden, African Studies Centre.

³⁰Ryan, S. (2006). *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*. Worcester, Dartmouth Publishing Company Limited.

³¹Stedman, S. (2002). *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

³²Gueli, R. & Van Huyssteen, E. (2005). *Developmental Peace Missions Theory*. Pretoria: Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR).

³³Secretary-General of the United Nations. (2008). Decision Number 2008/24 – Integration, 25 June 2008 Policy Committee, New York: United Nations.

³⁴Picciotto, R. (2005). *Fostering Development in a Global Economy: A Whole of Government Perspective, Introduction: Key Concepts, Central Issues*. Paris: OECD.

Paris asserts that Marshall Plan is linked to a period when Europe was destroyed, to the unchallenged power of the United States, to the dream of consumer society and to the power of the dollar.³⁵ The Marshall Plan answered European problems because the young international institutions, such as the United Nations (UN), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the World Bank, lacked efficiency. The Marshall Plan was a success because it associated considerable financial aid with a modernization plan of the whole European economic system, and it made the union of Europe possible. It permitted to overcome the territorial nationalisms of the 20th century. It worked because the danger of war was not urgent anymore in 1947, and it fell in 1950 due to the threat of hot war. The Marshall Plan represented an unstable equilibrium between a fixed aid (take or leave) and a negotiated aid, between political imperialism and respect for participant countries. It meant important technological and financial transfers, opening markets and minds. It drove to its own end as quickly as possible.³⁶

According to Sommers the shocks of the unexpected eruption of internal armed conflicts in post-Cold War West Africa continue to linger in policy and academic circles.³⁷ This is particularly evident in the relative lack of well-grounded theorization and robust academic debates on the different aspects and overall dynamics of the post-war reconstruction agenda in Africa. Disturbingly, recent policy debates and actions across the continent have tended to either underestimate or relegate to the background issues connected to the social agency of political actors, notably power elites, and the character of regimes, even when it is realized that new forms of conflict in Africa are essentially about the intractability of the struggle for power, pursued by every available means.³⁸ Conversely, the rebuilding of institutions, through simultaneous reforms in the economic, political and security sectors, is seen 'optimistically' as the only route to 'rescuing' Africa from its seemingly vicious cycle of civil conflicts, state collapse and underdevelopment.

Kindiki urges that the effects of the Marshall Plan on Africa's economic miracle are still controversial. On the one hand, public opinion and traditional economic history in Africa have it that the Marshall Plan marked the beginning of Africa's fabulous post-war recovery.³⁹ On the other hand, an influential school among Africa economic historians maintains that post-war reconstruction in Africa and throughout Europe was largely

³⁵Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

³⁶Uvin, P. (2002). The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms. *Journal of Peacebuilding & Development* 1 (1).

³⁷Sommers, M. (2000). *The Dynamics of Coordination*, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Affairs, Occasional Paper #40, Providence.

³⁸Mohammed, A., Paulos Tesfagiorgis and Alex de Waal (2002). Peace and Security Dimensions of the African Union. Addis Ababa, African Development Forum (ADF III) Economic Commission for Africa 17.

³⁹Kindiki, K. (2003). "The normative and institutional framework of the African Union relating to the protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and security: A Critical Appraisal." *African Human Rights Law Journal* 3: 20.

independent of the Marshall Plan.⁴⁰ In this view, both the late beginning and small magnitude of ERP deliveries to Africa provide evidence of the Marshall Plan having been irrelevant for Europe post-war growth.⁴¹ Rather, the multitude of catching-up possibilities open to Africa and all other continents in the world held to have accounted for the Golden Fifties. The fact that super growth prevailed almost everywhere in Europe is taken as evidence against a major role for economic policies or even the choice between central planning or more liberal economic systems.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This part introduces two analytical approaches to examine models and frameworks in light of understanding its relations to PCR. The first theoretical perspective deals with a bottom-up approach to state formation.⁴² It entirely studies some of the underlying assumption based on Hobbes' Consent Theory. While emphasizing the bottom-up line of thinking, Hobbesian perspective in general terms views the basis of political authority in light of mutual agreements among members of the society with the main driving factor being the search for security provision for the sake of societal mutual gains at the expense of sacrificing the unlimited individual freedoms which at times endanger the mutual peaceful co-existence of each and every member of the community at large. So the issues of PCR is analysed from the perspective of consent as opposed to coercion while peace is believed to be guaranteed in as long as that authority is never absolute rather voluntary established.⁴³

Contrarily, the second perspective is the top-down approach that argues in exactly the opposite direction. This part studies Force Theory and looks into its basic theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, force theory, as subscribed to the assumptions of Hume and IbnKhalidoun, contends that state formation and the subsequent PCRas outcomes of usurpation and conquest than consent.⁴⁴It gives a brief overview of the nature of the process of PCRAfrica. Its main premise, being naked force is a source of state's sovereign powers; it presumably admits the fact that states of post-colonial nature for instance are always dependent for their survival on external sources than the consent of the rules. In this kind of ruler and ruled relationships, PCRand hence, peace will always be at stake when such external supports are reduced or left over leading to grave consequences like weakening or the demise of the continent.⁴⁵

⁴⁰Smith, D. (2003). *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: the Synthesis Report of the Joint Utstein Study on Peacebuilding*. Oslo: PRIO.

⁴¹ Hoffman, S (2007). *The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian Intervention*, University of Notre Dame, Indiana, 1997.

⁴²Moller, B. (2009).*The Somali Conflict.THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS*. Copenhagen, Danish Institute For International Studies.

⁴³Hanson, S.(2008). "Somalia's Transitional Government."Retrieved Nov. 2, 2009.

⁴⁴Solomon, D. (2009). "The Somali Conflict: Implications for Peace Making and Peace Keeping Efforts." Retrieved Nov. 12, 2009.

⁴⁵Adedeji, A. (2004). *Comprehending and Mastering African Conflict*, Zed Books Ltd., London, England.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study utilized sources of historical/comparative data, and analytical techniques. The historical approach facilitated the study of the main trends of Africa PCR mechanisms. Africa conflict is majorly in pre-colonial and colonial periods which was carefully reviewed and analyzed in order to come to grips with social organization, type of government, relationships among countries conflict resolution mechanisms, and relationship with outsiders as they continued to struggle for peace. Secondly, all relevant data related to Africa PCR were examined to make sense of the varied, complex dynamics of a conflict-laden society.

This study aimed to achieve both a more complex and fuller explanation of PCR Africa by analysing the models and frameworks and mainly the relevance of the Marshal Plan. In this study, the populations of interest were 7 Africa ambassadors based in Kenya and 4 humanitarian interventions selected for this study.

The study used both secondary and primary data. Secondary data was obtained from the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics, the Central Banks of Africa, the World Bank, UNDP, The study utilized primary sources such as United Nations Resolutions, US Congressional hearings, and data from the World Bank. These primary sources were supplemented by secondary sources, including books, periodical journals, newspapers, and relevant internet websites.⁴⁶ Primary data will be collected using an interview guide (Appendix I). Interview guide provided a high degree of data standardization and adoption of generalized information amongst any population. Data analysis answered the research questions and assisted in determining the trends and relationships among variables. Contents analysis was used to analyze the data. Findings which emerged from the analysis were used to compile the report.⁴⁷

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS (PCR): AN OVERVIEW

Typologies of PCR

In the post-Cold War era, the focus of international conflict management has increasingly shifted from peacekeeping, which was about maintaining the status quo, to peace building, which has to do with managing change.⁴⁸ The nexus between development, peace and security has become the central focus of the international conflict management debate, and peace building is increasingly seen as the collective framework under which these peace, security, humanitarian, rule of law, human rights and development dimensions can be brought together under one common strategy at country level. These developments culminated, as the centrepiece of the UN reform proposals of the 2005 World Summit, in the

⁴⁶Elizabeth M, (2007), *Peacekeeping as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies*, Boulder, CO.

⁴⁷Preece, R. (1994). *Starting Research – An Introduction to Academic Research Dissertation Writing*. Great Britain. Pinther.

⁴⁸Lange, G. & Wright, M. (2010). *Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The example of Botswana*. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA). Discussion Paper Series, 2002(3) University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. In Africa, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) adopted a PCR Framework in 2005 and the AU adopted a PCR and Development Policy in 2006.⁴⁹

Conflict is inherent in all societies. Differences in interests and opinions between groups and countries are natural, but how such differences are expressed and managed determines if conflicts will manifest themselves in primarily political (non-violent) or violent ways.⁵⁰ When groups within a society pursue their objectives in accordance with the laws and established norms of that society, conflict tends to be predominantly political.⁵¹ In other cases, however, groups turn to violence to pursue their interests, and the use of violence outweighs the use of political means. A better understanding of what affects the level and dynamics of conflict can ensure that policy interventions do not instigate, exacerbate, or revive situations of violent conflict, but instead, if well designed and implemented, can help reduce conflict. Homer-Dixon asserts that the widespread societal conflicts in Africa are often played out against the backdrop of deep poverty, illiteracy and weak systems of governance.⁵² Undermined by unfavourable terms of trade, indebtedness and administrative failures, most states in Africa have not responded adequately to the critical social needs of their citizens.⁵³

The economic and human costs of these conflicts have been extremely high. In the most extreme cases, African insecurity has been reflected in traumatic episodes of collapsed and/or "fragile states". Almost invariably, state collapses are products of long-term degenerative politics marked by a loss of control over the economic and political space. As would be expected, collapsed states in Africa, as in other parts of the world, have had harmful spillover effects on neighboring countries.⁵⁴ The flow of refugees, heightened insecurity and ethnic tensions and the resulting diplomatic conflicts have all engaged substantial resources and efforts from relatively stable countries that share borders with collapsed states.⁵⁵

49Nitzschke, H. (2003). *Transforming War economies: Challenges for Peace Making and Peace Building*. Report of the 725th Wilton Park Conference, New York, USA, 27-29 October 2003.

50 Findlay, A. (2006). *Population and Environment in Arid Regions*. Policy and Research Paper No. 10. Paris, International Union for the Scientific Study of Population.

51 UNEP (2010), *Western Indian Ocean Environmental outlook*, Nairobi, United Nations

Environmental Programme.

52Homer-Dixon, T. (2004). *Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases*. International Security, 19 (1), 5-40.

53FAO (2010). *ACC Inter-Agency Task Force on the UN response to long-term Food Security Agricultural Development and related aspects in the horn of Africa*, Rome, FAO.

54African Union Commission (2008) *Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention. Proposal for an indicators module towards the operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System for African Union*, Issue paper Number.

55 Saunders. M., Lewis. P & Thornhill. A (2003) *Research Methods for Business Students*. Harlow: Financial times, Prentice Hall.

In the process, what was once thought to be merely domestic conflicts, out of the purview of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), regional organizations such as the African Union (AU), or multilateral agencies like the World Bank, have now taken a center stage. Since 1980, for example, the volume of the World Bank lending to post-conflict countries has increased over 800 percent, to US\$6.2 billion, and touched every region and economic sector.⁵⁶ The shocks of the unexpected eruption of internal armed conflicts in post-Cold War West Africa continue to linger in policy and academic circles.⁵⁷ This is particularly evident in the relative lack of well-grounded theorization and robust academic debates on the different aspects and overall dynamics of the post-war scholars have almost surrendered to the dictates of international organizations, international financial and aid agencies and, lastly, non-governmental organizations. Whereas considerable attention has been devoted to explaining the outbreak of civil wars, there is still a disproportionately poor understanding of the processes and implementation of PCR agenda in Africa.⁵⁸

Nonetheless, it is important to acknowledge that a good understanding of the etiology of civil wars is critical to early cessation of hostilities, and in preventing a possible relapse. It is against this background that this study interrogates the contemporary PCR agenda and practices in Africa by focusing on two West African countries, Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁵⁹ Disturbingly, recent policy debates and actions across the continent have tended to either underestimate or relegate to the background issues connected to the social agency of political actors, notably power elites, and the character of regimes, even when it is realized that new forms of conflict in Africa are essentially about the intractability of the struggle for power, pursued by every available means.⁶⁰

Conversely, the rebuilding of institutions, through simultaneous reforms in the economic, political and security sectors, is seen 'optimistically' as the only route to 'rescuing' Africa from its seemingly vicious cycle of civil conflicts, state collapse and underdevelopment.⁶¹ Although this growing tide of institutional optimism is important for the security and stability of those African states that are emerging from protracted civil conflicts and wars, it represents far less optimism under closer scrutiny and in practice. Theoretically, post-war transformation represents a rare window of opportunity to rebuild failed state institutions and society and to avoid the pitfalls of the past.⁶² At one level, therefore, it is an opportunity to

56Auty, R. (2012). *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse Thesis*. Routledge, London.

57DMC (2000). *Ten-Day Bulletin*. DEKAD 19 report (1-10 July 2000), Nairobi, drought Monitoring Centre.

58Kasperson, R. (2001). *Research and Assessment Systems for Sustainability*. The George Perkins Marsh Institute Clark University.

59Acharya, M. (2005). 'Amateur Radio, A potential tool in emergency operations' Magazine, Volume 3, Number 1, January 2005, Centre for Science, Development and Media Studies, New Delhi, India.

60 Putnam, L. (2010). 'By Choice or by Chance: How the Internet Is Used to Prepare for, Manage, and Share Information about Emergencies', *First Monday*, Volume 7. Oxford publishers

61Muthuma, G. (2007b). "Clans and Crisis in Somalia." Retrieved Sep. 23, 2009.

62IFRC (2001). *World Disasters Report 2001*. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent societies.

implant 'real' or institutional democracy, as is often the case, and minimize dissent among rival power elites.⁶³

In practice, however, rebuilding societies and states in post-war countries raises far more troubling questions than answers, especially in view of the inability of previous political successions and reconfigurations in Africa, to bring about desired changes in the character of political leadership.⁶⁴ The arguments made in this study are thus threefold. First, is to contend that state-of-the-art PCR agenda in Africa are plagued by serious theoretical, organizational and practical inadequacies. Second, regardless of whatever optimism may prevail about rebuilding institutions and institutionalism, managing or transforming the underlying socio-political agency of power elites and regime character, is central to the understanding and resolution of the socioeconomic, political and developmental problems being experienced by many, if not all countries, across Africa. Third, given the fact that the nature of elite conflict and competition precipitates and accentuates a majority of the civil conflicts in Africa, successful PCR agenda must necessarily reflect upon, and if need be, tinker with the composition and nature of power elite interactions in the affected state(s).⁶⁵

Ebata found that the failure to do so has left post-conflict societies in Africa highly vulnerable to a relapse into new rounds of conflict or at least a continuation of pre-war and wartime practices, including non-formal state activities, e.g., illegal and indiscriminate exploitation of natural resources.⁶⁶ As such, there is an urgent need for empirically grounded and in-depth comparative research on PCR in Africa and elsewhere, so as to generate and contrast cross-country experiences. This is with a view to enriching the understanding of the content and context of PCR efforts as well as the myriad and daunting challenges they present. In the particular context of Africa, the imperative for cross-national comparative research cannot be devalued in view of the important geographical, socio-economic, historical and political ties that link the diverse conflicts in the different regions.⁶⁷

The cessation of hostilities, particularly regarding internal conflicts, is but one step towards the permanent and lasting resolution of the conflict. The end of a conflict can only come about after the parties involved have found solutions to the various causes of the conflict. Furthermore, all armed conflicts bring damage, destruction, ruin and inflict wounds that take

63Samarajiva, R., Malathy K., Peter S. &Zainudeen.A, (2005).*National Early Warning System: Sri Lanka – A Participatory Concept Paper for the Design of an Effective All-Hazard Public Warning System, Version 2.1*, Lirneasia, Sri Lanka.

64Wesley, M. (2007).*Casualties in the New World Order: the Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars*, St. Martin's Press, New York, New York.

65Samatar, A. (2012). "Africa impasse: State, Power and Dissent Politics." *Third World Quarterly*, 2 (3): 871-90, 1987.1992. "Destruction of State and Society in Africa: Beyond the Tribal Convention." *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30 (4).

66Ebata, M. (2001).*Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Analysis and Programming.A Review of CCA/UNDAF process*, Toronto, Canada.

67 Henderson, I. (2004). *Training in Mediation: African Solutions to African Problems*, ACCORD, South Africa.

a long time to heal.⁶⁸ A conflict that lasted one year, for example, can cause damage that will stunt the coherent and lasting developing of the particular region or country for over ten years. Several developing countries have undergone this regrettable experience and are finding it difficult to make any economic headway.⁶⁹

Hagmeyer and Weissman assert that history has provided with an example, the Marshall Plan, which can allow us to hope that well-designed and well-managed programmes or plans can lead to the reconstruction of regions or countries devastated by war.⁷⁰ Many continue to allude to the Plan but are reluctant to reproduce it under different circumstances. IPU must muster up the moral strength, through active diplomacy, to convince the world economic powers to invest a little bit more PCR. According to ISDR many countries around the world are currently in need of such action, including Somalia, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central African Republic, Angola, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁷¹ Although some of these countries have already been targeted by regional organisations, others, particularly those in Africa, have been truly abandoned. In many cases, everything seems to indicate that, if nothing is done to help them in the reconstruction process, they will succumb yet again to chaos.

On the official level, it is important for interim arrangements such as ceasefire agreements or truces, which would eventually have been signed, to be strengthened by more lasting mechanisms.⁷² For instance, between two warring States, the conclusion of bilateral friendship treaties could be envisaged following the spectacular example of Germany and France. Here are two States which, after several centuries of mutual mistrust and bloody hostilities, started a friendship which today is one of the most solid on the European continent.

In the absence of a friendship treaty, warring States from the same geographical region can conclude a good neighbourliness treaty containing rules and mechanisms for guaranteeing non-aggression and multisector cross border cooperation arrangements.⁷³ Examples of such an arrangement exist in several regions throughout the world, for example the Quadripartite

68Chairman of Commission, (2009).*Enhancing Africa's Resolve and Effectiveness in Ending Conflict and Sustaining Peace*: Special Session of the Assembly of the Union on the reconsideration and resolution of Conflicts in Africa, Libya 30-31 August 2009.

69 Cutler, J. (2007). *Armed Conflict in Africa. A threat to Regional Co-operation*. United Nations Environmental Programme.

70Hagmeyer, G. & Weissman, M. (2003). *Early warning indicators for Preventative Policy. A new approach to Early Warning Research*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2003.

71ISDR. (2004). *Living with Risk. A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives*. Volume 1. Geneva: United Nations.

72 Lodge, G. (2008). *Towards Understanding Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa*,

Monograph No. 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa: April 2008.

73World Bank (2007). *Upgrading Urban Communities*, version 2001. Spotlight on Alexandra, South Africa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Agreement between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana concluded with a view to stabilising an area where the borders inherited from colonisation are shifting and cannot easily abide by the resolution of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted in Cairo in 1964 on the intangibility of these borders.⁷⁴

Sub-regional organisations, and to a lesser extent regional organisations, provide frameworks in which latent conflicts can be averted via mechanisms established to maintain an environment of peace among the various member States.⁷⁵ The parliaments that make up the IPU should therefore encourage the establishment of friendship and good neighbourliness treaties and the setting up or promotion of sub-regional organisations to assist in peacekeeping by maintaining and strengthening a climate of international reconciliation.⁷⁶ Collier and Hoeffler assert that PCR, like other disciplines, has unique concepts that require explanation.⁷⁷ The study identifies a “country conflict” as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where the preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the state.

In each situation, external agencies need to understand the varying histories and the nature of the “failure” process in order to calibrate informed intervention measures to facilitate the transition from war to sustainable peace, support the resumption of economic and social development, and determine at what point in the post-conflict process is a particular country can be judged to have achieved a relative normalcy.⁷⁸ Foster asserts that they are very important precisely because conflicts are always unique and require tailor-made approaches.⁷⁹ They differ, *inter alia*, in duration, intensity and scope of the destruction, the relative military and political strength of the opponents, and the degree to which the middle and upper classes are affected by the hostilities. Whereas the conflicts in Uganda and Sierra Leone were products of state failure due to predatory or ineffectual governance and foreign incursions, the Rwandan state erosion was a product of ethnic-cum-regional conflict and the Mozambican state failure was due to ideological conflict.

74Cutter, S. (2006).*The Geography of social vulnerability: Race, Class and Catastrophe*.

75Checkland, P. (2009). *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice*, John Wiley and Sons. New York.

76Wisner, B., Blaike, P., Cannon, T. & Davis, I. (2004).*At Risk, Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters*. (2nd ed.) New York: Routledge.

77Collier, P. &Hoeffler, A. (2004).*The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War*.Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper.

78Douglas, O., Kemedi, V., Okonta, I. & Watts, M. (2010).*Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: A response to CSIS on Petroleum, Politics and Democracy in Nigeria*. Foreign Policy in Focus Special Report. Foreign Policy in Focus, Silver City and Washington, D.C. *Environmental Health in Emergencies and Disasters: A Practical Guide: WHO 2010*.

79 Foster, H. (2010). *Disaster Planning.The Preservation of Life and Property*. New York:Springer-Verlag.

PCR, like post-natural disaster reconstruction, typically involves the repair and reconstruction of physical and economic infrastructure, it also entails a number of interventions aimed at rebuilding institutions and society.⁸⁰ Such interventions include jump-starting the economy, reconstructing the framework for democratic governance, rebuilding key social infrastructure, and planning for financial normalization. In contrast Ehrlich and Ehrlich, unlike post-disaster construction, PCR assistance often operates amid tensions and suspicions between key actors both nationally and internationally, which can and does influence relations among the engaged international parties as well.⁸¹ Moreover, a civil war alters both the level and the structure of economic activity in ways, which persist beyond the war.

As other cross-country studies have demonstrated, unlike post-post disaster reconstruction, PCR interventions are radically different from “normal” operations.⁸² The devastation of human, social and physical capital often found at the beginning of the post-conflict period, and the particular provisions of the peace agreement, both require a paradigm shift when diagnosing and prescribing policy interventions, which should be conflict mitigating. The volatile and fast-changing circumstances of post-conflict societies demand a high degree of flexibility and speed in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs.⁸³ In addition, Bobeica asserts that post-conflict interventions tend to have explicit objectives like supporting the transition from war to peace, resumption of economic and social development, reconciliation and reconstruction, human and institutional capacity building, special investment funds to maintain social cohesion during the period of economic adjustment, poverty reduction and decentralization.⁸⁴

Moreover, a PCR process typically requires at least two decades of sustained effort, with recurrent risks of war. Arguably, conflicts are often protracted rather than limited in duration and tend to tear the country’s social fabric and destroy its physical and human capital.⁸⁵ Recovery requires incremental planning and careful and realistic policy reforms as well as consideration of the post-war constraints and peace agreements.⁸⁶ Raising taxes in post-conflict situations, for example, may discourage private investment and downsizing the civil service under public sector reform programs may contradict agreements made under the peace accords. Standard procurement and disbursement procedures can easily degenerate into

80Commission on Human Security (2003) *Human security now*. CommunicationsDevelopment Incorporated, Washington.

81Ehrlich, P. & Ehrlich, A. (2010). *The Population Explosion*, London, Arrow Books.

82Demer, G. (2009). *Fundamentals of Geographical Information Systems*, USA, John Wiley and Sons.

83 Von Bertalanffy, L. (2008). *General Systems Theory: Foundations, development Applications*, G.Braziller, New York.

84Bobeica, J. (2009). *A study of root causes of conflict using Latent Scientific Analysis*, IPSC Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Italy.

85IPCC (2010). *Climate Change: The scientific basis Contribution of working group 1 to the third assessment report of the Inter-governmental panel on climate change*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

86ISDR. (2012). *Living with Risk. A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives*. Geneva:United Nations.

serious stumbling blocks to recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation. Post-conflict operations require intensive monitoring to ensure their continued relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and timely preparation of post-conflict completion reports to disseminate the lessons learned.⁸⁷

Conflict in Africa: An Overview

The manifestations of conflict in Africa and the socio-historical transformations that accompanied it can be traced to the colonial period when the process of organization of power within the colony, administration and extraction of economic potential was based on the concept of conflict.⁸⁸ These manifestations have given rise to tribal identity, cultural prides and values which help many conflict groups to claim self-determination, cohesion and a sense of belonging. However, they are also responsible for creating hatred, resentment and conflict as different groups compete with one another in order to gain access and control of scarce resources and political power at the expense of others.⁸⁹

Conflict has taken central stage in the politics of many African countries to the extent that current political upheavals, civil wars, massive displacements and misery can be to a large extent attributed to conflict rivalries and confrontation. Most conflicts on the African continent have taken place within intra-state although they have not been immune to outside interference. The people fighting together in these conflicts, justification notwithstanding, are more often than not members belonging to the same conflict or religious affiliation. Because of this, there is a tendency to attribute the actions of the warring parties to primordial conflict connotations (which is not true), for example that they are fighting the other because of cultural or religious differences. Gomme and Patrassi assert that in the realm of peace and security in Africa, the 1990s witnessed dramatic and profound changes throughout the continent.⁹⁰ With the conclusion of the Cold War, some of the major tensions between East and West over the African battleground were markedly eased. South Africa and Namibia installed democratically elected governments.

Relative peace and stability was established in Mozambique after three decades of confrontation between warring parties. Several dozens of African countries held democratic elections. Unquestionably, all these were positive and significant signs of peace, stability and

87UNDHA (2004). *First African Sub-Regional Workshop on Natural Disaster Reduction*.

Gaborone, 28 November to 02 December 2004. Gaborone United nations department of Humanitarian Affairs.

88Demer, G. (2009). *Fundamentals of Geographical Information Systems*, USA, John Wiley and Sons

89FAO (2011). *17 countries are facing exceptional Food Emergencies in sub-saharan Africa. FAO concerned about deteriorating food situation in Sudan, Somalia and*

Zimbabwe. Press release 01/48. Rome. FAO.

90Gomme, M. & Patrassi, K. (2006). *Rainfall Variability and Drought in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1960*. FAO. Agro meteorology Working Paper No. 9, Rome, FAO.

development.⁹¹ However, while many parts of the world moved toward greater stability and political and economic cooperation, Africa remained one of the cauldrons of instability. Political insecurity and violent conflict became increasingly persistent realities of the development scene in Africa.⁹² Internal strife with deep historical roots surfaced in many countries on the continent.

The international community paid less and less attention to African security affairs, the continent's institutional and organizational capacity to manage its pervasive conflicts was not developing at the same pace as the escalations of conflict. Against such a backdrop, peace and peacemaking in Africa emerge as critical issues in global politics. Widespread societal conflicts in Africa are often played out against the backdrop of deep poverty, illiteracy, and weak systems of governance.⁹³ Undermined by unfavorable terms of trade, indebtedness and administrative failures, most states in Africa have not responded adequately to the critical social needs of their citizen. In the most extreme cases, Africa's insecurity has been reflected in traumatic episodes of collapse is a product of long-term degenerative politics marked by a loss of control over the economic and political space.⁹⁴ As would be expected, collapsed states in Africa have had harmful spill over effects on neighboring countries. The overflow of refugees, heightened ethnic tension in some cases, and the resulting diplomatic conflicts, have engaged substantial resources and efforts from relatively stable countries that share borders with collapsed states.⁹⁵

In the process, what were once thought to be merely domestic conflicts, and thus not within the purview of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) have now become internationalized.⁹⁶ External actors have been drawn into what was technically a civil war in order to restore peace and security. It has become increasingly apparent that Africa should develop the capacity to deal with its own growing domestic security problems.

Essence of Conflict and Conflict Mapping

According to Clothier the root causes of conflict in Africa have been the subject of much debate and the nature of violence has been poorly understood.⁹⁷ In contrast to the stereotypes

91 Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-15: *Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities in disasters*. World Conference on Disaster Reduction 18-22 January, Kobe, Hyogo, Japan.

92 UNDP (2011) *Disaster Profiles of the least developed countries*, Geneva, United Nations Development Programme Emergency response division.

93 UN/ISDR (2006) *International Strategy for Disaster Risk Reduction*, issue 13, 2006.

94 UNDP (2009) *Reducing Disaster Risk – A Challenge for Development*. United Nations Development Programme, New York.

95 Versteegen, S. (2010). *Conflict Prognostication: Toward a tentative framework for Conflict Assessment*, The Hague.

96 Anderskov, C. (2004). *Anthropology and Disaster - An analysis of current trends within anthropological disaster research, and an attempt to construct an approach that facilitates theory building and applied practices - analyzed with vantage point in a case study from the flood-prone Mutarara District in Mozambique*

97 Clothier, J (2005). 'Africa trial SMS disaster alert system', CNN.com.

of “ethnic” conflict in Africa, evidence appears to show that Africa’s great ethnic diversity actually reduces, rather than increases, the chances of conflict occurring. However, in some cases it seems that where one ethnic group is numerically dominant this may increase the chances of conflict. Power and the manipulation of ethnic identity by elites, is a major driving force. Therefore ethnicity is a cause of conflict. Ethnic conflicts are very common in the Great Lakes Region in countries like the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and Kenya.

According to the Dilley, causes of internal conflict include: competition over land and resources, sudden and deep political or economic transitions, growing inequity among people and communities, increasing crime, corruption and illegal activities, weak and unstable political regimes and institutions, and identity politics and historical legacies, such as colonialism.⁹⁸ In several places, economic motivations have been a critical factor: the international arms trade is very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa, and the protagonists themselves. In Liberia, the control and exploitation of diamonds, timber and other raw materials was one of the principal objectives of the warring factions. Control over those resources financed the various factions and gave them the means to sustain the conflict.

In Angola, difficulties in the peace process owed much to the importance of control over the exploitation of the country’s lucrative diamond fields. In Sierra Leone, the chance to plunder natural resources and loot Central Bank reserves was a key motivation of those who seized power from the elected Government in May 1997.⁹⁹ Kim gives a thorough typology of Africa’s armed conflicts since 1990 as having been caused by the following seven issues: ethnic competition for control of the state, regional or secessionist rebellions, continuation of liberation conflicts, fundamentalist religious opposition to secular authority, warfare arising from state degeneration or state collapse, border disputes, and protracted conflict within politicized militaries.¹⁰⁰ Kim goes further to briefly describe and discuss the above issues in an endeavor to show and justify how they have been a root cause of conflict in Africa.¹⁰¹

Competition and conflict are regarded as phenomena inherent in both nature and society. Arguments to support this proposition are that conflict and competition are inevitable and ubiquitous in all societies at all times.¹⁰² Similarly, in the best of circumstances, conflict and competition are bounded and circumscribed. Contending groups of people and rival nations get involved in violent conflicts either because their vital interests or their values are

98Dilley, H. (2007) *Warning and Intervention. What kind of information does the response community need from the early warning community?* *Internet Journal of African studies*, Vol 2, University of Bradford.

99Dunnette, R. (2006). 'Radio and TV Broadcasting for Disaster Relief and Public Warning', *Pacific Telecommunications Council '06 Proceedings*.

100 Kim (2010) *Southern Africa swamped by rains*. Disaster News Network.

101AMISOM (2009) Burundi Deploys Third Battalion AMISOM WEEKLY1, 04

102Ori, K. O. (2009). "Uganda dares Somalia's al-shabab Islamists ". Retrieved Nov. 05, 2009.

challenged or because their needs are not being met.¹⁰³ The deprivation (actual or potential) of any important value induces fear, a sense of treat, and unhappiness. Whether contending groups in a particular society are defined by ethnicity, religion, ideology, gender, or class identities, they have, by definition, different needs and interests, values and access to power and resources. Understandably, such differences necessarily generate social conflict and competition. What is at issue, therefore, is how to represent, manage and resolve inherent social conflicts before they degenerate into violence and massive destruction. The aim of conflict prevention then is not to prevent conflict as such; prevention then, is not to prevent conflict as such, but to reduce the likelihood of specific conflicts becoming violent.¹⁰⁴

Within this context, Kadesh asserts that conflict has become a strategy and means for mobilization where the ruling elites, often members of an conflict cleavage use repression and marginalization against other groups in order to maintain a strong grip on power.¹⁰⁵ This generates a feeling of relative deprivation on the part of the groups affected and spurs social discontent which provides the motivation and drive for collective violence. The dynamics of this situation are such that the group in power mobilizes for support using conflict to maintain power while the relatively deprived groups will tend to resort to war in the absence of amicable redress, by also mobilizing through conflict in order to remove those in power who are perceived as the source of their frustration and deprivation.¹⁰⁶

Such a situation then results in a vicious cycle of violence in which the parties to the conflict use the discourse of group hatred to further mobilize on conflict lines. The armed rebellions, coup d'états, insurgence and civil wars that have bedevilled many countries on the African continent should be viewed in this light.¹⁰⁷ This section aims at explaining the link between conflict and conflict by employing theories advanced by scholarly works. This is because in order for conflict to be contained or eliminated, it is important to understand the motivation of actors and the conditions that predispose them to violence. According to a report by FSNAU there were states which were created by European colonial powers at the Berlin Conference, their bureaucratic authoritarianism, instrumentalized disorder, patronage and greed for power has had adverse effects on state building, inter-ethnic relations, national integration, social economic development and stability.¹⁰⁸

103 Subramanian, T. (2011) *Their own Warning System*. Front line. Volume 22, Issue 02, 15-

28 January 2005.

104 Opala, K. (2006). *Africa: climate change fuelling conflicts* Retrieved from <http://allafrica.com/stories> on 14/12/09.

105 Kadesh, K. (2008). "Africa in Perspective: An Orientation Guide." Technology Integration Division. Retrieved Nov. 12, 2009.

106 AMISOM (2008). "AMISOM: Background and Political Developments." Africa for Peace, Stability and Development. Retrieved Sep. 12, 2009.

107 Cornwell, R. (2009). "Hope for Settlement in Africa Fade." Retrieved Nov. 4, 2009.

108 FSNAU (2009). "Africa: Half the Population in Humanitarian Crisis Amid An Escalating Civil War." International Academic Journals

In actual fact ethnicity has gained momentum largely due to its manipulation and politicization by rulers in the struggle to maintain hegemonic control of state power and resources. This in turn has shaped the scope of ethnic politics, and the particular character of state society relations to the extent that rulers have tended to ignore national integration of the diverse ethnic groups, but have instead undermined it by arbitrary and authoritarian use of state power to enrich themselves, allocate jobs to ethnic tribesmen, thus breaching the social contract of public trust. As aptly noted by Ahari, the politics of political tribalism and moral ethnicity become linked to the ability of the 'big men' of ethnic communities holding positions in the state to obtain for the districts and regions a significant share of the large-scale collective benefits as well as more individual rewards apportioned through the discrete personal contracts of the back verandah.¹⁰⁹ The relationship between the state and citizenship is also an important dimension if the phenomenon of ethnic conflict especially on the African continent is to be understood.

Construction of Conflict in Africa: The Post-Colonial African Context

The modern social relations in which post-conflict plays a significant role can be traced to the colonial period when the colonial system and processes of state formation were based on the colonial ideology and culture of divide and rule.¹¹⁰ This period which started with the Berlin conference of 1884-85, witnessed the division of African societies into political units called states with clearly defined boundaries. Ironically these boundaries split the traditional social structures, consequently ignoring conflict cohesiveness, economic potential and distribution of natural resources.¹¹¹ Within these states, further subdivision was made whereby districts and counties were created with boundaries drawn on the basis of the concept of the tribe which was an invention of the colonial masters and not from the people making up these units.

The point being emphasized is that the imposed boundaries for the most part ignored cultural patterns in the colonized societies, because after all, the colonialist was not interested in the formation of a state on the notion of western structure, but rather for expansionism, quest for markets, imperial aggrandizement, strategic reasons and extraction of capital.¹¹² Soon after the exercise of partitioning, the colonialist then moved quickly to assert his authority and influence in the territory. This was necessary in order to deter competing rivals from taking

Retrieved Nov. 12, 2009.

109Ahari, M. (2010). *Change and Continuity in the Middle East. Conflict Resolution and Prospects for Peace*, St. Martin's Press, New York, N.Y.

110UNDHA (2004). *First African Sub-Regional Workshop on Natural Disaster Reduction*. Gaborone, 28 November to 02 December 2004. Gaborone United nations department of Humanitarian Affairs.

111Bobeica, J. (2009). *A study of root causes of conflict using Latent Scientific Analysis*, IPSC Joint Research Centre, European Commission, Italy.

112Anderskov, C. (2004). *Anthropology and Disaster - An analysis of current trends within anthropological disaster research, and an attempt to construct an approach that facilitates theory building and applied practices - analyzed with vantage point in a case study from the flood-prone Mutarara District in Mozambique*

over the territory on one hand, but also to identify and establish alliances with preferred natives through whom colonial rule would be extended to the rest of the territory. Categorizing, and sorting out natives by forming a typology of the different groups and authoritatively defining and dictating the rules of the game; what was and wasn't permitted, was a prerequisite for ease of administration.¹¹³

Arising out of institutionalization of colonialism in the process of state formation which relied heavily on the basis of post-conflict is the fact that the state began as a weak state and has to a large extent remained a weak state.¹¹⁴ This is mainly because colonial powers omitted to transfer important aspects that characterize the modern state to Africa. Doctrines concerned with civil liberties, limitations of power, constitutionalism, liberalism and the principle of nationhood were carefully left behind. However, explaining the context and nature of the state in Africa and its link with post-conflict necessitates having a working definition of a state.¹¹⁵

The state in Africa has been analyzed in the context of the state in Europe.¹¹⁶ While the state in Europe is characterized by factors such as consensus, ability to extend control over the territory, legitimacy and political order which to a large extent explain the socio-political unity and cohesion, in the developing world it tends to be characterized by socio-political exclusion and marginalization of some groups, hegemonic domination, and rule through patrimonial networks which leads to relative deprivation thus providing breeding ground for discontent, conflict, violence and political instability.¹¹⁷ Although this generalization may not apply entirely to all countries as there are some where state-society relations are cordial and which are politically stable, many countries remain under personal rule based on conflict ties resulting in their legitimacy to be challenged by some sections of the population.

Many countries in Africa including Uganda do not seem to suit this definition and can therefore be described as weak states where conflicts are attributed to the fact that governments have failed to assertively exert and extend their authority to the entire territory under their control and have also been unable to bring about and sustain conflict unity or provide new incentives for different conflict groups to live together.¹¹⁸ Moreover, conflict

113Nitzschke, H. (2003). *Transforming War economies: Challenges for Peace Making and Peace Building*. Report of the 725th Wilton Park Conference, New York, USA, 27-29October 2003.

114African Union Commission (2008) *Meeting the Challenges of Conflict Prevention. Proposal for an indicators module towards the operationalisation of the Continental Early Warning System for African Union*, Issue paper Number.

115Kasperson, R. (2001). *Research and Assessment Systems for Sustainability*.The George Perkins Marsh Institute Clark University.

116Acharya, M. (2005). 'Amateur Radio, A potential tool in emergency operations' Magazine, Volume 3, Number 1, January 2005, Centre for Science, Development and Media Studies, New Delhi, India.

117Wesley, M. (2007). *Casualties in the New World Order: The Causes of Failure of UN Missions to Civil Wars*, St. Martin's Press, New York, New York.

118 Henderson, I. (2004). *Training in Mediation: African Solutions to African Problems*, ACCORD, South Africa.

manipulation exacerbates old conflicts and creates new ones as rulers try to concentrate their efforts on suppressing dissent. Leadership becomes more vulnerable and because of this vulnerability, the focus shifts from people relations to maintaining power at all cost. Clapham aptly captures this situation of weak states when he uses the metaphor of a ship's captain to describe this type of rulers when he says that they cannot spend time setting the course and navigating but rather only concentrate on staying afloat.¹¹⁹

Colonialism effected conflictisation through stereotyping. In this process, conflict groups were compared with one another on the basis of capabilities and disabilities as the determinant criteria for collective group worth.¹²⁰ While group comparison is an aspect of life that can be used positively for emancipation and mobilization of people to enjoy public goods and services, it can also be used for dividing, disempowering and discriminating against them. The origin of these rivalries can also be traced in groups discrimination and the colonialist comparative process of evaluating the virtues and vices of conflict Africans which were based on the premise that the ruled were unfit to manage their own affairs and in which even the most advanced conflict groups among the colonial people were denigrated which further lead to fracturing of societies along conflict lines. In tandem with the legacy of discrimination and aggravating it was the manner in which colonial rule handled and nurtured post-conflict in Africa.¹²¹

Post-conflict was handled unevenly and inconsistently to the extent that often there was deliberate use of a group against the other which led to feelings of resentment, fears, mistrust, and hatred among the different conflict groups making the potential for conflict high.

In post-colonial Africa, post-conflict has continued to be a major factor in determining the success or failure of a country and has manifested itself in a number of ways.¹²² Political power control, access to and distribution of economic resources has largely remained in the hands of strong men whose rule is characterized by informal patriarch networks based on conflict and regional lines. Whereas the post-independent rulers and its influence on inter and intra-conflict relations and perceptions on the other.¹²³

Instead of the state using citizenship positively as a tool for social mobilization, emancipation, socio-political cohesion and harmony, it has in most cases used it as a means to marginalize or exclude particular people from political participation and denying them certain rights and privileges, by questioning their ancestry and origin, which often makes the disadvantaged to express their discontent through conflicts and civil wars. The issue of

119 Hagemeyer, G. & Weissman, M. (2003). *Early warning indicators for Preventative Policy. A new approach to Early Warning Research*, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), March 2003.

120 Lodge, G. (2008). *Towards Understanding Contemporary Armed Conflicts in Africa*, Monograph No. 36: Whither Peacekeeping in Africa: April 2008.

121 Wisner, B., Blaike, P., Cannon, T. & Davis, I. (2004). *At Risk, Natural Hazards, People's Vulnerability and Disasters*. (2nd ed.) New York: Routledge

122 Foster, H. (2010). *Disaster Planning. The Preservation of Life and Property*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

123 Demer, G. (2009). *Fundamentals of Geographical Information Systems*, USA, John Wiley and Sons.

citizenship and its relationship with the state has had an influence in conflict conflicts. The problem between citizenship and the state tends to lie in the definition of the concept and who is a real citizen in the real practical sense.¹²⁴ This is because in the context of the state, there are two major categories of people, that is, citizens and non citizens or aliens. The two categories enjoy different rights and privileges and are not necessarily subject to the same rules and regulations. It is also worth noting that citizens of the state are subdivided into further categories of indigenous and non indigenous, immigrants and settlers.¹²⁵

Border Disputes

Disputes over the precise location of colonial frontiers assumed a military dimension in the cases of Nigeria and Cameroon, Eritrea and its neighbours, and Botswana and Namibia. Between 1994 and 1996, Cameroon contested Nigeria's garrisoning of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula before both sides submitted the issue of the region's legal status to international arbitration.¹²⁶ Sporadic fighting between Nigerian and Cameroonian soldiers caused an exodus of 5 000 refugees. In 1993 Namibia and Botswana became involved in a dispute over ownership of the Sedudu Island in the Chobe River.¹²⁷ Botswana claimed that its investiture of the island by the Defence force was in response to Namibian poaching activities. National competition for control over the Okavango/Chobe water reserves is probably the main reason for the tension between the two countries. While the status of the island is now under international review, Botswana has begun an ambitious programme of military expansion.¹²⁸

Finally, in the Horn of Africa, the new state of Eritrea has aggressively contested its boundaries with South Yemen and Djibouti, and most recently, with Ethiopia. In May 1998, large-scale tank and artillery battles between Eritrea and Ethiopia followed the Eritrean military occupation of the Yigra triangle, a barren 400-square kilometre region of desert.¹²⁹ Subsequently both countries mounted bombing raids on each other's towns. Part of the background to this dispute was Ethiopia's refusal to accept currency parity after Eritrea's launch of the Nafka, the related cessation of Ethiopian purchases from Eritrea's oil refinery,

124IPCC (2010). *Climate Change: The scientific basis Contribution of working group I to the third assessment report of the Inter-governmental panel on climate change*. New York, Cambridge University Press.

125Douglas, O., Kemedi, V., Okonta, I. & Watts, M. (2010). *Alienation and Militancy in the Niger Delta: A response to CSIS on Petroleum, Politics and Democracy in Nigeria*. Foreign Policy in Focus Special Report. Foreign Policy in Focus, Silver City and Washington, D.C. *Environmental Health in Emergencies and Disasters: A Practical Guide*: WHO 2010

126Ebata, M. (2001). *Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Analysis and Programming. A Review of CCA/UNDAF process*, Toronto, Canada.

127 Cutler, J. (2007). *Armed Conflict in Africa. A threat to Regional Co-operation*. United Nations Environmental Programme.

128 Lange, G. & Wright, M. (2010). *Sustainable Development in Mineral Economies: The example of Botswana*. Centre for Environmental Economics and Policy in Africa (CEEPA). Discussion Paper Series, 2002(3) University of Pretoria, Pretoria.

129FAO (2010). *ACC Inter-Agency Task Force on the UN response to long-term Food Security Agricultural Development and related aspects in the horn of Africa*, Rome, FAO.

mutual complaints about smuggling, and discrimination against Ethiopians in the Asmara job market.¹³⁰

In a special session of the assembly of the African Union on the consideration and resolution of conflicts in Africa, in August 2009, the chairman of the commission reported that, Africa is host to 8 United Nations operations, including a political mission administered by UNDPKO.¹³¹ It constitutes over 60 percent of the agenda of the UN Security Council. In 2007, it was estimated that 38 percent of high intensity conflicts in the world took place in Africa.¹³² This bears testimony of the mammoth task that lies ahead in resolving conflicts. The task of resolving protracted conflicts such as Congo, Darfur and Somalia with serious regional and international consequences remains a considerable challenge. Also equally challenging is the task of sustaining transitions from war to peace.

Checkland stated that, early phases of the transition from conflict to peace always show that peace processes remain fragile and the risk of resumption of violence is high.¹³³ This is because countries emerging from conflicts are characterized by weakened or non-existent capacity at all levels, destroyed institutions and the absence of a democratic culture, good governance, rule of law and respect for human rights. Furthermore, peace and security challenges on the continent are not limited to large scale armed conflicts.¹³⁴ Apart from armed conflicts there are other types of conflicts, which include political violence, boarder disputes, inter-communal strife, targeted attacks and food riots which all indicate the beginning of conflict disasters.

The causes of this worrying situation (conflict) came out clear from the commissions' chairman.¹³⁵ He highlighted the causes of conflict as including ethnic and religious extremism, corruption, exclusionary definitions of citizenship, poverty and disease, the illegal exploitation of Africa's renewable and non-renewable natural resources and mercenarism. To these should be added a host of other factors ranging from competition for land and other resources, misallocation of resources and shortcomings in governance, as well as subversion by outside actors. The situation is aggravated by the illicit proliferation, circulation and

130Auty, R. (2012). *Sustaining Development in Mineral Economies: The Resource Curse* Thesis. Routledge, London.

131Muthuma, G. (2007b). "Clans and Crisis in Somalia." Retrieved Sep. 23, 2009.

132ISDR. (2004). *Living with Risk. A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives*. Volume 1. Geneva: United Nations.

133Checkland, P. (2009). *Systems Thinking, Systems Practice*, John Wiley and Sons. New York.

134World Bank (2007). *Upgrading Urban Communities*, version 2001. Spotlight on Alexandra, South Africa, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

135Chairman of Commission, (2009). *Enhancing Africa's Resolve and Effectiveness in Ending Conflict and Sustaining Peace*: Special Session of the Assembly of the Union on the consideration and resolution of Conflicts in Africa, Libya 30-31 August 2009.

trafficking of small arms and light weapons and the scourge of drug trafficking, which poses an ever increasing threat to peace and security in Africa.¹³⁶

The History of the Marshall Plan and its Relevance to Africa Context

The development of the Marshall Plan as a coordinated economic recovery effort came about at a time when the United States was beginning to realise that it would prove more and more difficult to export to Europe due to the continents dwindling supply of American dollars. As such the first goal of the plan was to ensure the stability of the American economy, through its continued expansion, by restarting trade with Europe. Collier and Hoeffler argues that after a war a country's economy can expand but as Europe was so devastated this could not occur at a reasonable pace.¹³⁷ With demand for goods falling leading to lower productivity and employment in Europe, Washington was eager to ensure that it had a market to sell its vast produce to and thus avoid an economic slump itself. Europe was to be this market and in order to sell to it, the United States government made loans and grants available which would then be spent on American goods which would ensure that the US economy was kept moving.¹³⁸

The American economy depended on the expansion of overseas markets as areas that it could sell to and any contraction in this market would hurt the US. As this dissertation will discuss, the Marshall Plan was a vehicle used to expand the US economy by creating a market.¹³⁹ It spread the American free market into Europe under the guise of economic aid which was in essence an imperial action as it gave Europe relatively little choice in the matter despite the participant countries being engaged in the planning and distribution of the aid packages. As Kennan had outlined, economic measures were needed in order to contain the Soviet Union and the Marshall Plans second goal was just this.¹⁴⁰ Communist promises of a better lifestyle under the Marxist-Leninist system were an obvious comfort to the populations most affected by the destruction which ravaged Europe and indeed Communist parties in both Italy and France were proving to be increasingly popular as the continent struggled to recover with the Italian Communists polling over 50 percent in some provinces in the 1948 elections.¹⁴¹ It would be very likely that any Communist governments in these countries would be dominated in the main by Joseph Stalin which would mean even more Soviet influence over Europe, although this may not necessarily have happened.

136Cutter, S. (2006).*The Geography of social vulnerability: Race, Class and Catastrophe*.

137Collier, P. &Hoeffler, A. (2004).*The Challenge of Reducing the Global Incidence of Civil War*.Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper.

138Commission on Human Security (2003) *Human security now*. Communications Development Incorporated, Washington.

139Gommes, M. &Patrassi, K. (2006).*Rainfall Variability and Drought in Sub-Saharan Africa since 1960*.FAO.Agro meteorology Working Paper No. 9, Rome, FAO.

140UNDP (2009) *Reducing Disaster Risk – A Challenge for Development*. United Nations Development Programme, New York.

141ISDR. (2012). *Living with Risk. A Global Review of Disaster Reduction Initiatives*. Geneva: United Nations.

By the summer of 1947 it was becoming plainly obvious that the Soviet Union had no plans on withdrawing from what came to be its satellite states in the East. It would have been a massive blow to the US if it were to allow itself lose the states of Western Europe to Communist dominance.¹⁴² If it did so it would be capitulating in the Cold War struggle and also losing markets something its economy would not tolerate as it needed highly consumptive markets such as Europe to buy its surpluses. While Communist parties were popular in some countries there was no real threat from the Soviet Union as regards the expansion of its influence into the Western half of the continent. Its economy had been destroyed by the war losing the equivalent of \$135 billion, completely the opposite of what happened to the US economy in the same time period with Stalin and his Politburo completely focused on the USSR's massive internal problems.¹⁴³ Stalin was hoping that the Grand Alliance of World War Two could continue despite the development of the Cold War and with this hope in mind he was attempting to forge sound relations with Washington. Aggression in Western Europe was certainly not one of his aims but even still the Marshall Plan was simply the other half of the Truman Doctrine, a plan to sustain capitalism in Europe and isolate the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁴

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MARSHAL PLAN AND ITS RELEVANCE TO AFRICA

Background: Chronological Proximity of Conflict during Colonial Development and Decolonisation in Africa

To understand the foreign and colonial policy of the Attlee government, it is also important to examine the political context of the African territories. Although the post-war period is truncated in popular memory as a period of rapid retreat from empire, in 1945, across the whole continent of Africa, only four countries were even nominally independent from European rule: Egypt, Liberia, South Africa, and Ethiopia.¹⁴⁵ However, it is true that, during and after the Second World War, there was a growing movement across the continent to question the legitimacy of imperial rule. This increase in nationalist sentiment was influenced by a variety of factors, not least the successful campaign in the Indian subcontinent which led to the partition of the Indian sub-continent and the creation of India and Pakistan in 1947; Burma and Ceylon (renamed Sri Lanka in 1971) followed in 1948.¹⁴⁶

A Colonial Office committee in 1947 warned of the 'almost irresistible force' which had been unleashed by Indian independence, and predicted that 'within a generation', many countries

142 Versteegen, S. (2010). *Conflict Prognostication: Toward a tentative framework for Conflict Assessment*, The Hague.

143 UNDP (2011) *Disaster Profiles of the least developed countries*, Geneva, United Nations Development Programme Emergency response division.

144 Kim (2010) *Southern Africa swamped by rains*. Disaster News Network.

145 Keen, D. (2010) 'War and Peace: What's the Difference?' *International Peacekeeping*, 7(4), pp. 1–22.

146 ICG (2004) 'Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States', *Africa Report*, No. 87, 08 December 2004.

in the Empire would be ‘within sight of full responsibility for local affairs’.¹⁴⁷ What was no doubt considered somewhat overdramatic at the time of Indian independence looks rather understated with historical hindsight. As Louis and Robinson highlighted, the Colonial Office in the 1930s believed that the African territories would remain within the empire until the twenty-first century; by the 1950s, they were predicting independence in the 1970s. In reality, Sudan, Ghana and Nigeria were independent states by 1960, when Moran proclaimed a ‘wind of change’ across the continent, to the distaste of the white inhabitants of Kenya, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.¹⁴⁸

Given the chronological proximity of colonial development and decolonisation in Africa, it is tempting to consider these processes as related.¹⁴⁹ Either the colonial government was attempting to placate indigenous nationalist movements by improving standards of living, or it was resigned to the inevitability of mass decolonisation and was therefore attempting to produce political, economic and social structures within the African societies that could be co-opted by newly independent states. The development of African nationalist movements provided a recurring undercurrent to the colonial development plans. Gurr has written about the transition by French and British metropolitan governments towards a ‘development-minded colonialism’, which was used to increase the efficiency of colonial economic extraction whilst simultaneously legitimating European rule.¹⁵⁰ However, the ‘second colonial occupation’ cannot be explained through a simple narrative of increased European control over the colonial economies.

The heightened levels of metropole-peripheral interaction after the Second World War and the more complete British intrusion into colonial life also increased the potential for antagonism of African populations.¹⁵¹ As in the Indian subcontinent, the experience of global conflict was a key factor in intensifying African criticism of and resistance to colonialism. In Africa, the Second World War ‘started earlier and lasted longer’ than the European experience of conflict. The Colonial Office recorded that 374,000 African soldiers were mobilised for the Allies, with around 7,000 fatalities; Kang and Meernik have estimated that over half a million African soldiers served in frontline and non-combatant roles.¹⁵² Warfare spilled across the continent, encroaching directly on colonial territories, with fighting in East Africa against Italian forces and in West Africa against Vichy France, and involving colonial

147 Gbla, O. (2006). ‘Security Sector Reform under International Tutelage in Sierra Leone’, *International Peacekeeping* 13(1), pp. 78–93.

148 Moran, M. (2006) *Liberia: The Violence of Democracy*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. National Recovery Strategy (NRS) Sierra Leone 2002–2003 (n.d).

149 Poku, N. (2007). ‘Human Security and Development in Africa’, *International Affairs* 83(6), pp. 1155–70.

150 Gurr, T. (2010) *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

151 ICG (2007) ‘Sierra Leone: The Election Opportunity’, *Africa Report*, No. 129, 12 July 2007.

152 Kang, S. & J. Meernik (2004). ‘Determinants of Post-Conflict Economic Assistance’, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 2, pp. 149–66.

empire and commonwealth armies in bloody battles against the German Africa Corps and the Italian armies in North Africa.

Against a backdrop of military campaigns, there was also an ongoing tension between African workers and their coloniser's employers and rulers. General strikes had begun in 1935 and continued once the war was over; between 1939 and 1945 there was some rioting, for example in the Gold Coast in Konongo in 1942 and Kumawu in 1943, mainly as a response to conscription and military conditions, although generally, as in the metropole, military requirements subsumed labour agitation.¹⁵³

Post-Conflict Reconstruction Models and Frameworks: Colonialism in Africa

According to the respondents the European colonial development predated the Marshall Plan, but there is no doubt that the machinery of the European Recovery Programme (ERP) created an organisational framework and legal structure within which transnational development programmes could operate.¹⁵⁴ In the British Bilateral Economic Co-operation Agreement, one of 16 bilateral treaties between each ERP nation and the USA, the United Kingdom was explicitly defined as 'including the Colonies ('self-governing and non-self-governing') overseas territories, protectorates and trusteeships'.¹⁵⁵ This meant that aid received by Great Britain could legitimately be spent in the colonial territories. When signing the Bilateral agreement, British officials had been uncertain about whether to fund colonial development through dollar sources, mainly because of the high costs involved. However, they were clear that it would be foolish to formally exclude the British Empire from the scope of ERP aid; it would 'seriously reduce' Britain's ability to use the Marshall Plan funds to meet their dollar requirements, and would probably lead to 'strong opposition' from the United States, as the colonies were a key source for the raw materials that the Americans were 'most anxious to receive for stockpiling purposes'. Britain was therefore happy to accept the formal definition of the Marshall Plan as aid to be shared around the colonial empire.

In March 1948, when the Cabinet discussed the ERP and the establishment of a continuing organisation to administer European recovery, Collier noted that there was 'much' for the Colonial Office to study in the proposals.¹⁵⁶ Fukuyama agreed, stressing that colonial

153 Curran, D. & Woodhouse, T. (2007). 'Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping Peace building in Sierra Leone: What can Africa Contribute?' *International Affairs*, 83(6), pp. 1055–70.

154 Adebajo, A. (2004). 'Pax West Africana? Regional Security Mechanisms'. In Adebajo, A. And R. Ismail (eds), *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in A Troubled Region*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner for International Peace Academy, pp. 291–318.

155 Abdullah, I. (2005). "'I am a Rebel". Youth Culture and Violence in Sierra Leone'. In A. Honwana and F. De Boeck (eds), *Makers and Breakers: Children and Youth in Postcolonial Africa*. Oxford/Trenton/ Dakar: James Currey/Africa World Press/Codesria, pp. 172–87.

156 Collier, P. (2004) 'Development and Security', Text of Public Lecture Delivered at 12th Bradford Development Lecture, Bradford Centre for International Development, Bradford University, UK, 11 November 2004.

development depended ‘on a healthy Africa’.¹⁵⁷ By early 1948, British officials had already decided that some elements of the ERP would be ‘distasteful’; however, they were at least confident that they would be able to ‘play the lead’ among the European countries in the various bodies and organisations involved in reconstructing the continent. Although this leading role never really transpired, international colonial development was a way for European powers to demonstrate to the United States their willingness and ability to cooperate effectively in reconstruction. This was especially important for the British, given their increasing unwillingness to embrace European cooperation. Portraying colonial development as a multilateral European action might also deflect any accusations that Britain was alone in exploiting its empire.

The British were certain that the only metropolitan states involved in colonial development should themselves be colonial powers.¹⁵⁸ This was partly due to simple considerations of practicality; observers from non-colonial states would have little to offer to detailed discussions of imperial policy. However, working within the framework of the Marshall Plan meant working within a context of European reconstruction. This was problematic because, if all Western nations were allowed to influence colonial development, the narrative that depicted experienced imperial powers fulfilling their colonial responsibilities and selflessly aiding their own territories’ development would be exposed as a sham. To this end, Britain resisted repeated attempts by the Italian government to be involved in the European discussions on colonial development, to avoid any accusations that there existed ‘a European club for exploitation of Colonies’; it was particularly important to maintain this resistance to avoid possible criticism from the new Commonwealth nations.¹⁵⁹

In order to maintain this position, the British government had to also exclude Dominion governments from the development discussions, as they were administered separately from the colonies and held no territories of their own. However, Britain was careful both to brief the Dominions Relations Office about development policy and to ‘avoid giving the impression that the UK can afford to ignore the help towards recovery she receives and has received from the Dominions’.¹⁶⁰

South Africa, in particular, took a ‘very lively interest’ in colonial development in the African territories; this was recognised by British politicians to be ‘entirely reasonable’ given their strong diplomatic, economic and political links throughout the continent, and so the South

157Fukuyama, F. (2006) ‘Nation-Building and the Failure of Institutional Memory’.In Fukuyama, F. (ed.), *Nation Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1–18.

158Carbonnier, G. (1998) ‘Conflict, Post-war Rebuilding and the Economy’, *WIDER Occasional Paper No. 2*. Helsinki: WIDER.

159Duffield, M. (2007) *Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the World of Peoples*.Cambridge: Polity Press.

160Kaldor, M. (2001) *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*.Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press.

African government was kept well informed of European progress, as well as being used as a location for a major African development conference in 1950.¹⁶¹ The British Government were apprehensive that the Dominions might become ‘concerned at the United Kingdom’s growing contact with Europe’; there was a chance that it would be perceived as potentially weakening Britain’s links with the Commonwealth, involving ‘onerous commitments out of harmony with the Dominions’ own interests’, and leading to a loss of capital goods from, or markets in, the United Kingdom.¹⁶²

The Dominions Relations Office was therefore always careful to ‘rub home’ the idea that strengthening Great Britain would ultimately (‘even if not directly’) strengthen the Dominions themselves; they also emphasised that European cooperation was an addendum, not an alternative, to the Commonwealth relationship.¹⁶³ Within the context of European collaboration, the relationship with the colonies was no less fraught with potential tension. It was essential, ‘for political and constitutional reasons’, if colonial governments were to be recipients of, or contributors to, the Marshall Plan, that they should be ‘consulted fully’.¹⁶⁴ British officials were wary of provoking the ire of colonial administrations by involving them in any sort of grand continental plan without their informed consent.

The Colonial Office was also anxious to avoid demanding too much information from the colonies, to avoid ‘overloading the machine’ or irritating Governors and Colonial Secretaries with frequent demands for extra work; as the bureaucratic machine in most overseas territories was fairly basic, any demands for statistics on trade, national income or cost of living were not popular among colonial administrations.¹⁶⁵ The British government was therefore not only trying to balance the demands of its American and European allies with its own domestic and foreign policies, but it was also trying to reconcile the needs and desires of the colonial governments with the policies and aims of the Foreign and Colonial Offices.¹⁶⁶

The Marshall Plan and Aid to Africa: An Overview

Politicians have long invoked the Marshall plan as a rhetorical device, clamouring for Marshall plans in the Caribbean, East Asia, Egypt, and even in the Gulf Coast after Hurricane

161 Mani, R. (2005) ‘Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict’, *Development* 48(3), pp. 25–34.

162 Pugh, M. (2004) ‘Peacekeeping and Critical Theory’, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 39–58.

163 Runciman, W. (2006). *Relative Deprivation and Social Justice*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

164 Tull, D. and A. Mehler (2005) ‘The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa’, *African Affairs*, 104/416, pp. 375–98.

165 Youngs, R. (2004) ‘Democratic Institution- Building and Conflict Resolution: Emerging EU Approaches’, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 536–43.

166 Woodhouse, T. & Ramsbotham, O. (2005). ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping and the Globalization of Security’, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 139–56.

Katrina.¹⁶⁷ British Prime Minister Gordon Brown has taken up the banner, calling during his chancellorship for a Marshall Plan for Africa. Prominent figures such as Bill Gates, Bono, and economist Jeffrey Sachs have likewise swelled the ranks. Unlike past advocates, however, many of these new Marshall Plan proponents use the phrase literally and call for vast increases in aid.¹⁶⁸ It should be clear from the above that the European Marshall Plan and post-independence aid to Africa were responses to entirely different situations, so drawing parallels between the two is not justified. Some fifty years of accumulated experience about outcomes for Western Europe and Africa informs the contrast. Comparing the two ventures, the following factors stand out.

The initial conditions differed markedly between the two regions. Western Europe was a highly developed region with a well-endowed human resource base and strong political and legal institutions. In Africa, when the colonial regimes departed, systems protecting property rights were either abandoned or emasculated by new African rulers. This was true virtually everywhere, from Angola to Zambia.¹⁶⁹ Yet donors to Africa did not take into account political and institutional factors, presuming rather that foreign aid particularly from multilateral financial institutions was “neutral” with respect to the type of political system in place. In addition, very little institutional reform was attempted in African lending. Most bilateral lending was influenced by Cold War rivalries and by competition to enlarge spheres of influence rather than to support economic performance.¹⁷⁰

The purposes of the MP and the lending to Africa are different: the former was for reconstruction, and the latter is for development. History shows that development is more challenging. Compared to Africa, many countries such as those of East Asia have had excellent records of development since the mid-1960s.¹⁷¹ The Marshall plan was not premised on “poverty traps,” “big pushes,” “filling financial gaps, take-offs or other questionable conceptual artifacts. Aid to Africa has been premised on these concepts and, what is more, they are being revived now to justify the quadrupling of lending to Africa. These concepts were flawed when they were first used in the 1950s, and they are even more flawed now.

167 McEvoy-Levy, S. (2006). ‘Introduction: Youth and the Post-Accord Environment’. In McEvoy-Levy, S. (ed.), *Troublemakers or Peacemakers? Youth and Post-Accord Peace Building*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 1–26.

168 Coyne, C. (2006). ‘Reconstructing Weak and Failed States’, *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2 Summer 2006, pp. 143–62.

169 ECOWAS (2009). *Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security*. Abuja: ECOWAS.

170 Williams, R. (2000) ‘Africa and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform’. In Cilliers, J. and A. Hilding-Norberg (eds), *Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium*. ISS Monograph. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

171 Malone, D. & Wermester, K. (2000). ‘Boom and Bust? The Changing Nature of UN Peacekeeping’, *International Peacekeeping*, 7(4), pp. 37–54.

The Marshall plan underwrote the movement toward continued peace and democracy in Europe by providing aid to West Germany and Italy and keeping the Communist East at bay. The Marshall plan's administrators did not let the French extract large amounts of compensation from the vanquished Axis powers as it had done after World War I. In this respect, the Marshall plan also ensured peace. In contrast, foreign aid to Africa was not designed to support democracy or keep peace. If anything, a large number of dictatorships were kept in power with aid. Aid also failed to prevent civil and ethnic wars from breaking out in Africa. Given the fungibility of money, African lending may have actually helped sustain conflict by enabling these governments to buy arms.¹⁷²

The Marshall plan was time-limited, operating for a mere three years from its first disbursement in 1948 to full disbursement in 1951.¹⁷³ Conversely, lending to Africa has been open-ended, continuing for nearly fifty years. Nor did the MP create aid bureaucracies, as those created for Africa have perpetuated aid. The Marshall plan helped Western Europe restore capitalist economic organizations in war-mobilized Germany and Italy. The Marshall plan moved Western Europe toward liberal economic policies in trade, payments, and regulatory regimes, and away from the protectionism and statism of the 1930s.¹⁷⁴ Many of the transfers made to Western Europe under the MP helped private agriculture and industry. In contrast, lending to Africa had to be conditioned by government guarantees. Thus, African lending enlarged the public sectors of African economies. Moreover, lending to Africa, particularly structural adjustment loans, did not support as much reform as claimed. This was because loans were given for the same reforms over and over again, governments did not meet the conditions of loan agreements, large aid inflows created macroeconomic problems in African countries similar to those in oil-exporting Nigeria, and the loans did not produce the desired results that is, they neither raised rates of return nor increased domestic savings rates.

The roles of the private and public sectors were markedly different under the Marshall plan and lending to Africa. Analysts who want to draw a parallel between the Marshall plan and aid to Africa have failed to recognize the part played by the private sector in the reconstruction of Europe.¹⁷⁵ Although public funding was involved, the private sector determined most activities under the MP program. In stark contrast, the public sector has driven most foreign aid to Africa. The Marshall plan was intended to be a European program and was therefore designed, implemented, and monitored by European policymakers. When asked, U.S. personnel provided advice from the sidelines, but Europe ran the program. The opposite is the case in Africa.

172Gennip, J. (2005). 'Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development', *Development* 48(3), pp. 57–62.

173Dobbins, J. (2004). 'The UN's Role in Nationbuilding: From the Belgian Congo to Iraq', *Survival* Vol. 46, No. 4, Winter 2004–05, pp. 81–102.

174Bello, W. (2006). 'The Rise of the Relief-and- Reconstruction Complex', *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 281–96.

175 Addison, T. & Murshed, S. (2001). 'From Conflict to Reconstruction: Reviving the Social Contract', *UNU-WIDER, Discussion Paper*, No. 2001/48. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

Aid there has been led, designed, and determined by donors. African policymakers, at least in the beginning, accepted the design and advice partly because they did not have the manpower and skill to use the aid themselves and partly because these non-democratic governments were more interested in having the funds than showing results.¹⁷⁶ Under the Marshall plan, donors had a limited role: provide the money and monitor payments from the counterpart funds unobtrusively. Automobile executive Paul Hoffman administered the ECA with the assistance of well-known academics like Adebajo.¹⁷⁷ They were not career aid officials; Congress had insisted on an independent body to administer the Marshall plan on the U.S. side. They did not orchestrate the European program. Europe had capable leaders of its own, including Maurice Schumann in France, Ludwig Erhard in Germany, and Luigi Einaudi in Italy. But in Africa, foreign donors played the dominant role.¹⁷⁸

Marshall plan and African lending operated under different incentives for both borrowers and lenders. Lending under the Marshall plan led donor and recipient interests and incentives to converge.¹⁷⁹ Donors provided what the recipients needed, and incentives were aligned to balance demand and supply. By contrast, aid to Africa was mostly decided by donors and bureaucracies that perpetuated existing arrangements. Officials who made large loans in Africa were rewarded, so they had an incentive to escalate rather than diminish their lending. On the recipient side, beneficiaries did not expect to be held accountable for the funds, so they had little incentive to use the money effectively. In fact, much of the money transferred under aid disappeared from its intended recipient countries. Barnett has indicated that 40 percent of African wealth is held abroad.¹⁸⁰ Former Nigerian president Sani Abacha, for example, held up to \$5 billion abroad as part of his private savings.

It should not be surprising, then, that the outcomes of the Marshall plan and aid to Africa have differed significantly.¹⁸¹ The Marshall plan helped launch sustained growth in Western Europe, such that it remained above pre-war levels for two decades. Africa saw an entirely different outcome. As foreign aid increased, economic growth rates declined. Foreign aid did not lead to new investment, and investment did not lead to growth. Meanwhile, poverty

176 Berger, M. & Weber, H. (2006). 'Beyond State- Building: Global Governance and the Crisis of the Nation-state System in the 21st Century', *ThirdWorld Quarterly*, 27(1), pp. 201–8.

177 Adebajo, A. (2002). 'Liberia: A Warlord's Peace'. In Stedman, J., D. Rothchild and E. Cousens (eds), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder/London: International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation: Lynne Rienner, pp. 599–631.

178 Dodge, T. (2006). 'Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-building in Historical Perspective', *Third World Quarterly*, 27(1), pp. 187–200.

179 Borer, T. (2006). *Peace building after Peace Accords: The Challenges of Violence, Truth, and Youth*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

180 Barnett, M. (2006). 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War', *International Security*, Vol. 30, No. 4, pp. 87–112. BBC News/Africa, (13 December 2007), "Sierra Leone

181 Abdullah, I. & Muana, P. (2008). 'The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. A Revolt of the Lumpenproletariat'. In Clapham, C. (ed.), *African Guerrillas*. Oxford/Kampala/Bloomington and Indianapolis: James Currey/Fountain Publishers/ Indiana University Press, pp. 172–94.

increased, and social indicators remained dismal. The Marshall plan did not operate the way some present-day advocates for Marshall Plans contend it did. The sums of money were not what mattered. It was rather a combination of supporting institutions, credible reforms, and movement toward democracy that allowed Europe to live in peace.

The advocates of a Marshall plan for Africa, on the other hand, emphasize the money. For example, at Gleneagles, Scotland, in July 2005, leaders of the G8 countries agreed to raise development assistance to Africa by \$25 billion by 2010 and by another \$25 billion by 2015. These amounts are over and above the present level of aid transfers to Africa, which is around \$25 billion a year.¹⁸² Additionally, in early 2005, the European Union (EU) supported the call for countries to earmark 0.7 percent of EU GDP \$250 billion for aid.¹⁸³ Of this amount, half would go to the forty-eight countries in Africa. If all this aid were actually given, it would amount to the staggering sum of \$625 billion over and above what Africa has received in the last decade. The difficulty of using this amount of aid without feeding more corruption creating macroeconomic problems relating to the absorption of the resources cannot be met with rehashed 1950s theories of aid.¹⁸⁴

These problems require a different approach from that put forward by Marshall plan enthusiasts. While some leaders and analysts such as Brown and Sachs make claims to the contrary, there is little evidence that Africa has improved in any significant way in terms of economic management, institutional arrangements, or implementation and monitoring frameworks. There have been some improvements, to be sure. In the last ten years, two-thirds of African countries have had multiparty elections, previously a rarity in the region. But Africa still has the lowest score of any region in the Freedom House index for civil liberties. Growth has recovered in a third of the countries in the past five years, mostly due to the recovery of commodity prices.¹⁸⁵ But these are subject to cyclical fluctuations and do not guarantee long growth. Without fundamental policy reforms and improvements in the institutional structures for assuring property rights that give the private sector more confidence to save and invest, African economic performance will remain low compared to that of other regions. The proposed New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and its monitoring arm, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), are good first steps toward policy reform and restructuring institutions to bring about greater economic freedom.¹⁸⁶ Experience to date with the NEPAD and APRM, however, is at best modest. They also suffer

182 Cooper, N. (2005). 'Picking out the Pieces of the Liberal Peaces: Representations of Conflict Economies and the Implications for Policy', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36(4), pp. 463–78.

183 Freeman, C. (2007). 'Introduction: Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghanistan', *International Peacekeeping*, 14(1), pp. 1–7.

184 Ismail, O. (2003). *The Day After: Child Soldiers in Post-war Sierra Leone*. Report submitted to theSSRC, New York, African Youth in the Era of Globalization Fellowship Programme.

185 Pouligny, B. (2005). 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building "New" Societies', *Security Dialogue* Vol. 36(4), pp. 495–510.

186 Peters, K. & Richards, P. (1998). 'Why We Fight: Voices of Youth Combatants in Sierra Leone', *Africa*, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 183–210.

from the grand-plan approach and poor ideas from the past, such as greater support for regional trade when there is little scope for it, ambiguity regarding private foreign capital, and limited transparency in monitoring each other's performance.

In addition, the World Bank report (prepared mostly by African intellectuals and politicians under the leadership of Blair and Brown), argues for increasing foreign aid, rather than reducing dependence on it.¹⁸⁷ The Africa Commission report was the main document cited for the promise of increased aid at Gleneagles. Instead of assuaging their collective guilt by transferring their taxpayers' money into aid programs, rich nations should keep markets for African goods open, allow foreign capital to flow freely, and let Africans find their own route to development. According to the key informant's responses, for too long Africa has been a theater for Western ideologues' pet panaceas, with disastrous consequences for long-suffering Africans. It is not as if Africa cannot develop: Botswana and Lesotho, to name two countries, show that Africa can produce spectacular growth.¹⁸⁸ The main lesson of the past is that aid should be modest, tailored to different countries' circumstances, and fully owned by the countries themselves. It is not enough to adopt the rhetoric and solutions of grand plans from the past. To do otherwise would be to subject Africa to even greater disappointment than before.

Foreign Aid in Post-Conflict Environment

According to the respondents there is no agreement among development economists regarding when, in which area, and how much aid should be given to post-conflict countries. Some argue that too much aid may contribute to rampant price inflation and widespread corruption. The respondents indicated that aid should have been provided early in the post-war period. This argument is based on the findings that there are high risks of peace agreements breaking down early. Whiteman and Yates estimate an economic policy regression and find that when policies are initially very poor, aid has a positive impact on them.¹⁸⁹ Similarly, Yannis argues that since revenue mobilization is very low during the beginning of the post-conflict period, an aid dollar has a higher marginal value (from a fiscal perspective) in the early years of recovery aid is needed for numerous tasks; to settle refugees, provide primary education and basic health services, establish safer water and sanitation, repair roads, and put micro-enterprises back to business, and so on.¹⁹⁰

187 World Bank (1998) *Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Perspectives and Prospects*. Paris: World Bank Post-Conflict Unit.

188 Schwarz, R. (2005). 'Post-Conflict Peace building: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 429–46.

189Whiteman, K. & Yates, D. (2004). 'France, Britain, and the United States'. In Adebajo, A. and Ismail, R. (eds), *West Africa's Security Challenges. BuildingPeace in a Troubled Region*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 349–82.

190Yannis, A. (2003) 'State Collapse and its Implications for Peace Building and Reconstruction'. In Milliken, J. (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 63–82.

Ugo provides an example from Mozambique where the promise of generous aid in the immediate post-war years was one of the factors that encouraged the Renamo, Mozambique's former rebel movement, to come to the negotiating table.¹⁹¹ However, the idea that the bulk of aid should come early is challenged by World Bank research. Olonisakin argue that a decade of aid is needed for post-conflict recovery and avoidance of further war and that the peak absorption period is in the middle four or five years of the decade (i.e., approximately the fourth through the seventh post-conflict years).¹⁹² Furthermore, the effectiveness of aid depends upon the quality of economic policies, governance and institutions.

Respondents indicated that, while needs are great, the quality of state institutions in post-conflict environment is so low that the capacity to use resources effectively is very limited and returns to aid are limited. They also argue that peace building aid to the post-conflict countries is often given at the wrong time and at the wrong rate. They observe that in the first couple of years of peace, a flood of aid enters the country, while over the entire course of the first post-conflict decade, the amount of aid delivered is no higher than it would be if the society were in a non-post conflict state.¹⁹³ From the perspective of maximizing the impact on growth, they recommend that donors should allocate large amounts of aid to the middle years of the first decade of post-conflict societies when the absorptive capacity of the country is sufficiently developed.

Impact of Marshall Plan in African

In contrast to the success of the Marshall plan, aid to Africa over the fifty years since its independence has been a failure. As aid has increased, African economic performance has declined. Many African countries have lower per-capita incomes today than they had in the 1960s. Official aid to Africa in the past twenty-four years was over \$715 billion in current dollars. Aid disbursed over the past fifty years is closer to \$830 billion.¹⁹⁴ Africa has received more aid than any other region in the world in the last fifty years, but it remains the poorest region in the world. When the original aid programs were launched, African countries were among the poor countries of the world, but they were not necessarily the poorest. In fact, some countries in Africa had higher per-capita GDPs than current economic powerhouses like South Korea, Taiwan, and India.¹⁹⁵

African countries are among the well-endowed in the world. The continent has the largest oil resources in the world after the Middle East. It has abundant mineral resources, including bauxite and diamonds, and enormous land resources. These natural endowments attracted

191Ugo, P. (2007). *Introduction to Post-war Reconstruction Programme*. Rome: International Institute of Agriculture. United Nations (20 Dec 2005) UN Security Council Resolution 1645, S/RES/1645.

192Olonisakin, F. (2008). *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner for International Peace Academy.

193 ICG (2002) 'Sierra Leone after Elections: Politics as Usual?' *Africa Report*, No. 49, 15 July 2002.

194Plattner, M. (2005) 'Building Democracy after Conflict: Introduction', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 5-8.

195Lederach, J.P. (2003) *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. Intercourse: Good Books.

colonial powers during the scramble for Africa in the 1880s.¹⁹⁶ Weak political systems and corruption took their toll on Africa. Most African countries became independent in the early 1960s. All of them were potential democracies. Within a generation, however, most fell to authoritarian rule. Property rights suffered the same fate. Ethnic fractionalization and corrupt rule have led to almost constant civil and regional wars in Africa. By 1998, a third of sub-Saharan Africa's forty-eight countries were involved in civil wars. By 1989, the region had 4 million officially recognized refugees and another 12 million people displaced in their own countries as a result of these wars.¹⁹⁷ Per-capita income on the continent has stagnated and in some cases fallen below pre-independence levels.

Aid to Africa has followed the prevailing winds in development economics. The design of programs followed the popular conceptual frameworks of the times, from "poverty traps" to "big pushes" that could lead to "take-offs into self sustained growth." These concepts are theoretically weak and empirically unfounded. The projects and programs went through many cycles and forms as the donor community kept changing its view as to what should be financed and how it should be done. Consequently, there was little ownership of borrowing by African countries. Prior to the 1980s, the development paradigms did not put much emphasis on market reforms like establishing open trade, welcoming private sector initiatives, and guaranteeing property rights.¹⁹⁸ Even after the 1980s, when there were attempts by the multilateral banks especially the World Bank to do so, market reforms were not taken very seriously in Africa. Both sides seem to have paid lip service to them, but there was no actual shrinking of the public sector or movement toward open trading policies and price-based allocation of resources. This stands in contrast to Western Europe after the Marshall plan, where there was a clear movement toward market reforms, even though its speed and intensity differed by country.

Aid to Africa has been the largest for any region. It averaged 6.3 percent of GDP for all of Africa, but if South Africa and Nigeria (a large oil producer) were excluded, this proportion would double.¹⁹⁹ This is in contrast to aid to Asia and Latin America. But even more important is the fact that these funds were largely given to the public sector, which often misappropriates aid. Foreign aid amounted to some 60–70 percent of government budgets

196 ICG (2003) 'Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance', *Africa Report*, No. 67, 02 September 2003.

197 Duffield, M. (2005) 'Social Reconstruction: The Reuniting of Aid and Politics', *Development*, 48(3), pp. 16–24.

198 Aboagye, F. (2009) *ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Experience in Conflict Resolution, Management and Peacekeeping in Africa*.

199 Berger, M. (2006). 'From Nation-Building to State-Building: The Geopolitics of Development, the Nation-state System and the Changing Global Order', *Third World Quarterly*, 27(1), pp. 5–25.

between 1985 and 2005.²⁰⁰ Public investment had low or negative returns, economic growth was low or negative, and debt repayment problems mounted. In addition, aid to Africa kept governments in power that ignored the general welfare of their populations and helped perpetuate poverty.

From the Marshall Plan to the Post-Cold War Era

Foreign aid in the form that we understand it today began as international post-war assistance. Because of the havoc wreaked during World War II, the U.S. was the main donor of foreign aid in the Post-War period.²⁰¹ Thus, most of the analyses of the determinants of aid during this period focus on motivations for U.S. assistance. Scholars of the structure and effectiveness of foreign assistance look to the Marshall Plan as one of the original and most successful foreign aid plans implemented in the last century.

The Marshall Plan, officially called the European Recovery Program (ERP), was a program developed by the United States to help Western Europe re-establish its economy and infrastructure post-World War II.²⁰² Within the framework of this program, the United States gave over \$13 billion in aid to assist European countries. Abraham has identified that the Marshall Plan had various motivations, ranging from imperialism to a sense of giving. However, the majority of scholars add that though altruism contributed to the decision of the United States to give foreign aid, the desire for a stable Europe, supported by a strong market-based economy was the main motivation.²⁰³ Still other scholars argue that political economy considerations lie behind the true impact of the Plan as the aid allocated provided the currency needed to relax the foreign exchange constraint.

Colonial Period and the Cold War

The next era of foreign aid development occurred at the nexus of the independence of formerly colonized countries of the 1950's and 1960's, the expansion of multilateral institutions as foreign aid donors, and the political dynamics of the Cold War.²⁰⁴ Respondents stated that the first wave of independent countries created a new "constituency" for foreign aid. This seemed to have fomented a new conceptualization of aid as both altruistic and as a type of reparation. Occurring simultaneously was the expansion of regional and multilateral

200 Darby, J. (2006). 'The Post-Accord Context'. In Darby, J. (ed.), *Violence and Reconstruction*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 1–10.

201 Stedman, J., Rothchild D. & Cousens, E. (eds), (2002). *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder/London: International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation: Lynne Rienner. *The Courier* (2003) 'Post-conflict Rehabilitation', No. 198, May–June 2003.

202 Forman, J. (2002). 'Achieving Socio-Economic Well-Being in Post-Conflict Settings', *Washington Quarterly*, 25, Autumn 2002, pp. 125–38. *The Foucault Effect*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 87–104.

203 Abraham, A. (2000). "The Quest for Peace in Sierra Leone." In *Engaging Sierra Leone, A Report by the Centre for Democracy and Development, London, CDD Strategy Planning Series 4*. London: CDD, pp. 12–36.

204 Boas, M. (2007) 'Marginalized Youth'. In Boas, M. and K. Dunn (eds), *African Guerrillas, Raging Against the Machine*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 39–54.

organizations. Starting as early as the 1970's, as aid to independent nations and post-war countries was no longer new and analysis was conducted on the effectiveness of this aid, it became clear that there needed to be more coordination of aid programs.²⁰⁵ One of these studies, called the Pearson Commission, offered recommendations which advocated, in part, that utilizing multilateral agencies to manage foreign aid would strengthen the effectiveness of foreign aid plans.

Two of the most impactful aid donor institutions have been the United Nations and the World Bank. Because of this expansion of multilateral institutions as aid donors, donor country governments have had to include these institutional donors into their aid allocation decision-making.²⁰⁶ Throughout the Cold War, foreign aid was seen as a means for political dominance. During this period, because of the fight for power between the former USSR and the United States, recipient countries had more leverage vis a vis the donor governments to reject conditions placed on aid; because the two major powers wanted to build supporters through aid donations, these powers did not have as much credibility to demand democratic changes to government nations receiving aid.²⁰⁷ Thus, foreign aid decisions during the Cold War were primarily strategic and politically motivated.

Post-Cold War Period

In the post-Cold War era, there has been an increased global value placed on democracy as it related to development. In the early 1990's with the dissolution of the former USSR, foreign aid donor governments began to reassess their foreign aid choices.²⁰⁸ Now that foreign aid did not necessarily need to be a purely political or strategic tool, and because research had shown that foreign aid had not proven to be as effective at improving development outcomes for poor countries as donor governments had assumed, donor governments were faced with the challenge of how to reconfigure foreign aid to make it work. This "rethinking" resulted in the acceptance of "good governance" and human rights as elements tied to conditional aid as way to improve development outcomes.²⁰⁹

Foreign aid scholars have described this change as a shift from using aid to support structural adjustment to conditioning aid on political values, from using foreign aid to encourage strategic alliances to conditioning aid to improve governance and award democratic

205 Fetherston, A. (2000). 'Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks', *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), pp. 190–218.

206 Keen, D. (2003) 'Greedy Elites, Dwindling Resources, Alienated Youths: The Anatomy of Protracted Violence in Sierra Leone', *International Politics and Society (IPG)*, 2/2003.

207 Wentges, J. (2008). 'Force, Function and Phase: Three Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 58–77.

208 United Nations (1997) Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, A/RES/51/242, 15 September 1997, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/a51r242.htm>.

209 Schnabel, A. (2002). 'Post-Conflict Peace building and Second-Generation Preventive Action', *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2), pp. 7–30.

accountability. This was a major change from the way that foreign aid had been conceived previously and led to a massive examination of indicators of democracy and governance effectiveness. These indicators in civil and political liberties, government accountability, and trade openness. McMullin sums up the overarching sentiment of bilateral and multilateral foreign aid donors during the post-Cold War period: in the emerging post-cold war world order, with the competition between East and West for political influence and strategic positions in the Third World removed, Western governments felt freer than before to pursue basic political concerns vis-à-vis the governments of the South.²¹⁰ As Heathershaw note, the freedom that donor countries experienced translated into a shift in focus to preventing humanitarian disasters, promoting good governance, and building political and civil liberties in states with poor records of progressive governance.²¹¹ In these ways, the end of the Cold War has affected how, when, and to what level donors give foreign aid.

Elements of Marshall as in the African Context

In order to clarify the relationship between different aspects of citizenship, the researcher refers to British sociologist T.H. Marshall's conceptual framework of citizenship. Marshall identified three elements of citizenship civil, political and social that corresponds to particular sets of rights associated with membership in a nation-state.²¹² According to Marshall, citizenship rights developed in chronological sequence: civil rights emerged in the eighteenth century, followed by the expansion of political rights in the nineteenth century; eventually, in the twentieth century, basic social rights were recognised. Civil rights include the rights to property, freedom of speech, and equality before the law, while political rights include the right to vote and the right to hold public office. Social rights, associated with social citizenship, refer to the right to a 'minimum provision of welfare' and may include rights to education, housing, food and water, etc.²¹³

The inclusion of welfare provisions in Marshall's notion of social citizenship corresponds to the development of European welfare states in the early 20th century.²¹⁴ When discussing the role of citizenship in relation to the unequal social and economic conditions prevalent in contemporary South Africa, the researcher consider Marshall's argument for social citizenship that includes a minimum provision of welfare. Marshall's defense of social citizenship centred on his belief that welfare provision was essential to citizenship in the

210 McMullin, J. (2004). 'Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 625–43.

211 Heathershaw, J. (2007). 'Peace building as Practice: Discourses from Post-conflict Tajikistan', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 219–36.

212 Foucault, M. (1991). 'Questions of Methods'. In Burchill, C., C. Gordon, P. Millar (eds), *The Foucault Effect*. Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, pp. 74–86.

213 Edelstein, D. (2004) 'Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail', *International Security*, 29(1), pp. 49–91.

214 Klingebiel, S. (2005). 'Africa's New Peace and Security Architecture', *African Security Review*, 14(2), pp. 35–44.

modern state.²¹⁵ Marshall argued that in the context of the modern social welfare state, such as Britain, socio-economic rights function as a necessary component of citizenship, offsetting the poverty and material inequalities of liberal capitalism.²¹⁶

Class inequalities within capitalism contradicted the formal equality of citizenship esteemed as the basis of liberal democratic societies.²¹⁷ The adoption of social citizenship served as a means to modify that inequality, effectively restraining class conflict, while maintaining a 'necessary tension' between capitalism and citizenship. Notably, in the case of Marshall's Britain, the rights of social citizenship were neither disseminated nor guaranteed by a written constitution but in and through the introduction of social welfare provisions by the state. This differs from the case of contemporary South Africa, where social rights are constitutional provisions that may be upheld in court.²¹⁸

Marshall wrote in Britain during the early 20th century and post-World War II expansion of social welfare states. Justified by the economic philosophy of John Maynard Keynes, the social services provided by early European social welfare states included education, health care, social security and employment.²¹⁹ In the late 1970s and 1980s, however, economic crises and the rise of 'neo-liberalism' led to the dismantling of some welfare states in favor of a conservative free market approach. Contemporary discourses of citizenship have criticised the failure of states to provide welfare for citizens, as well as posed alternative conceptions of citizenship that focus on expanding the capacity of civil society and exploring the horizontal dimension of citizenship. Without denying the need for state-led economic restructuring and transformation, the researcher emphasise the critical role of relationships between citizens in assuring inclusive social and economic citizenship. The role of citizenship should be to provide a space in which individuals may be recognised as members within the polity, assert their civil, political and social rights and defend their entitlement to access to a minimum provision of welfare.²²⁰

Current Developments

PCR is not a new phenomenon but can be linked to the Marshall Plan after the Second World War Reconstruction efforts in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq, have seen a revival of the

215Montgomery, J. &Rondinelli, D. (2004). 'A Path to Reconstruction: Proverbs of Nation-building', *Harvard International Review*, Summer 2004, pp. 26–9.

216Collier, P. &Hoeffler, A. (2001) *Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars*.US/UK: World Bank/CEPHR/CSAE.

217Dobbins, J. (2003). 'America's Role in Nationbuilding: From Germany to Iraq', *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003–04, pp. 87–110.

218Borer, T. (2006). 'Truth Telling as a Peacebuilding Activity: A Theoretical Overview'. In Borer (ed.), *Telling the Truths. Truth Telling and Peace Buildingin Post-Conflict Societies*.Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 1–58.

219Etzioni, A. (2004). 'A Self-restrained Approach to Nation-building by Foreign Powers', *InternationalAffairs*, 80(1), pp. 1–17.

220 Hazen, J. (2007). 'Can Peacekeepers be Peacebuilders?' *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 323–38.

concept in the early 21st century.²²¹ In Africa, PCR has become more prominent as a result of the peace processes in the DRC, Sudan, Burundi and the Comoros. As a result, the African Union (AU) and New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) have formulated policy frameworks dealing with post PCR and development.²²² As part of the UN's reform, its new Peace-building Commission is another institution which takes responsibility for PCR.

Admittedly, post-war reconstruction and peace building predates 1990 and transcends West Africa on account of the post- 1945 Marshall Plan in Western Europe and the expanded mandates of UN peacekeeping missions in Namibia and Cambodia.²²³ Sorensen, for instance, notes that civil wars accounted for 94 percent of all armed conflicts in the world in the 1990s and that between 1989 and 1999 at least 14 peace building missions were launched to consolidate peace in Angola, Mozambique, Rwanda, Cambodia, Bosnia, Croatia, Guatemala and El Salvador, among others. Also, the United Nations has launched over 55 peace operations since 1945, of which over 80 percent began after 1989 and at least 30 percent have been under way since 2003.²²⁴

The analyses of multiple experiments at PCR and peace building reveal frequent failures or mixed results at best. Reno for example, conclude that not only do about half of all peace support operations (including both peacekeeping and more expansive peace building operations) fail after around five years, but there also seems to be no clear idea of what 'success' or 'failure' actually means, nor of what an appropriate timeframe for measuring success might be.²²⁵ If the poor success rate of pre-2000 peace building was generally seen as being rooted in, or as purely administrative and technical matters, post-2001 global dynamics have heightened the politicization and ultimately the securitization of peace building.²²⁶ The post-2001 American-led War on Terror and major revisions of the global geostrategic security calculus have made PCR, peace building and state-building not only buzz-words, but key drivers of foreign policy in Western capitals.²²⁷ Thus Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq

221Sawyer, A. (2005).*Beyond Plunder: Towards Democratic Governance in Liberia*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner.

222Reno, W. (2003). 'Political Networks in a Failing State: The Roots and Future of Violent Conflict in Sierra Leone', *International Politics and Society(IPG)*, 2/2003.

223Natsios, A. (2005) .The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development, *Parameters*, Autumn 2005, pp. 4–20.

224 Sorensen, B. (2008). Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction, *WIDER Occasional Paper No. 3*. Geneva: WIDER.

225Reno, W. (1998) *Warlord Politics and African States*.Boulder: Lynne Rienner.Republic of Liberia (n.d.) *Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy. Breaking with the Past: From Conflict to Development*. Liberia.

226Nitzschke, H. &Studdard, K. (2005). The Legacies of War Economies: Challenges and Options for Peacemaking and Peace building, *InternationalPeacekeeping*, Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 222–39.

227 Richards, P. (2006). *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*.London:International African Institute and James Currey.

assumed prominence in this respect because of prioritized geopolitical and strategic linkages to the socioeconomic well-being and security of major global powers.

West Africa is also a major location for PCR and peace building. This derives from the sub-region's appalling record of insecurity, civil war and state collapse since the 1990s, not least in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Niger and Guinea-Bissau. Indeed, the sub-region significantly epitomized the widespread deterioration in security across Africa in the 1990s.²²⁸ The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute notes the continent's unenviable record of 19 of the total of 57 armed conflicts across the globe between 1990 and 2001.²²⁹ The civil wars of the 1990s and their "legacy" of recurring insecurity have sharply demonstrated the umbilical linkages between security and development. The challenges of conflict prevention, peace building and development encapsulated in Duffield's Global Liberal Order is most acute, not only in individual countries, but also assumes a sub-regional dimension in West Africa.²³⁰

In interrogating peace building in West Africa, the extent to which PCR, alongside violent conflicts and government dysfunctional ties, reshape the boundaries, powers, functions, size and domineering roles of the state in agenda setting, is explored.²³¹ In this regard, the proper sphere of intervention; the interests driving interventions and interveners relative to place and time; and the scientificity of different forms of interventions (convictions about how it guarantees peace and security) are interrogated. Also, the extent to which extant peace building attempts to re-governmentalize the state that is, reinvent the state and how this is informed by or informs previous experiences at state building in Africa is critically analyzed.²³²

Williams possible experiment and transition into a "post-post" or "neo-post" colonial state in Africa? The problematization of extant conflicts and post-conflict peace building exposes and illuminates several interesting and important paradoxes: for instance, between stability and change; peace and security; reform and transformation; imposition of liberal peace and Fukuyama's (2005: XV) "light-footprint" (short term and minimal cost of engagement); and between mere reconstruction or rebuilding and invention. Similarly, post-conflict settings underline the paradox between the need for a big and a small state; set time-lines and endless

228 Dzelilovic, V. (2002) 'World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in Post-war Reconstruction', *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2), pp. 81–98.

229 Jonah, J. (2004). The United Nations. In Adebajo, A. and R. Ismail (eds), *West Africa's Security Challenges. Building Peace in a Troubled Region*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 319–348.

230 Stedman, J. (2002). 'Introduction'. In Stedman, J., D. Rothchild and E. Cousens (eds), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder/ London: International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1–42.

231 Young, C. (2004). 'The End of the Post-Colonial State in Africa? Reflections on Changing African Political Dynamics', *African Affairs*, 103, pp. 23–49.

232 Pearce, J. (2005) 'The International Community and Peacebuilding', *Development* 48(3), pp. 41–9.

engagement (dependency); and between humanitarianism and political realism, or militant humanitarianism.²³³

The key objective is to re-examine post-conflict peace building as formulated and practised as a viable and only regime of truth with a view to stimulating recognition of the need for and building of alternative regimes of truths and a variety of “liberal peaces”.²³⁴ This comes from a belief that an uncritical and poor conceptual basis of post-conflict peace building can be problematic because of the kinds of goals and objectives being formulated; the unsustainability of its policies, institutions and structures over the long term; and the impact on populations beyond power elites and warlords. The conception and practice of contemporary post-conflict peace building in West Africa is tailored to stability rather than change, and “security” as opposed to “peace”. Inherent in this assertion is the debate about the possibility or impossibility of achieving change and stability and peace and security simultaneously. It is contended that external actors, faced with the highly conflictual, costly and time-consuming nature of change processes, discreetly and rationally opt for stability and security as opposed to transformation in post-conflict societies in West Africa and other Third World countries.²³⁵

The stability-security goals are limited to regimes (statelevel), coated in a liberal orthodoxy and designed to achieve the political and geostrategic objectives of interveners, including protecting the statist international system, stemming refugee outflows and undercutting potential infrastructures of transnational terrorism. The foregoing view is founded on three interrelated subtexts: first is the reality that extant post-conflict peace building is often reduced to, or synonymous with peacekeeping and PCR (defined as the physical rebuilding and/or reform of socioeconomic, political and security institutions and capacities after peace accords).²³⁶

Peacekeeping and PCR as components and phases in the peace building continuum overlap with, but do not equate with peace building. As such, the transformative goal of peace building involves, but transcends the rituals of cleansing, right sizing (downsizing) or invention of bureaucracies. It is the view in this essay that traditional and expanded peacekeeping (Peace Support Operations – PSO) and institutional re-engineering represent only technical and administrative tasks designed to prevent a relapse into Brzoska’s “direct violence”. Meanwhile, the more enduring and demanding peace building centred on transforming inherent “structural violence” and achieving “positive peace” are either

233 Williams, A. (2005). ‘Reconstruction’ before the Marshall Plan’, *Review of International Studies*, 31, pp. 541–58.

234 Simonsen, S. (2004). ‘Nation-building as Peacebuilding: Racing to Define the Kosovar’, *International Peacekeeping*, 11(2), pp. 289–311.

235 Joseph, R. (1999). ‘The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa’. In Joseph, R. (ed.), *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 57–82.

236 Addison, T. (1998) ‘Underdevelopment, Transition and Reconstruction in SSA’, *UNU-WIDER Research for Action*, No. 45. Helsinki: UNU-WIDER.

downplayed or considered insignificant relative to regime stability, at least in the short term.²³⁷ The failure of the sub-region's main security actor and apparatus the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to articulate any policy or institutional mechanisms for peace building beyond peacekeeping or at best, peace-support operations, tangentially illustrates this.²³⁸

Second, the emphasis on a “security first approach” and a relapse into “peace-as-collusion” paying-off of warlords and factions for peace sacrifices resources and commitments towards sub-national peace building. Hence, the skewing of peace accords to co-opt and reward potential spoilers legitimises new relationships of power and relocates violence from the public (state-level) to domestic, private and community domains.²³⁹ Third, the overarching role and powers of external actors as drivers of peace building, underpinned by the moral and ideological commitment to liberal reforms as the ultimate source of domestic and international security, wrongly assumes war and peace as diametrical opposites.²⁴⁰ It also attempts to securitize democracy, as opposed to democratising security, and represents a Foucaultian technology of “normalization” part of a systematic creation, classification and control of anomalies in the constituents (states) that comes from the promise to isolate and normalise deviant behaviours (civil wars and state collapse).²⁴¹

Hence, “normality is identified with democracy; abnormality with nondemocratic rule”. The liberal and neo-liberal emphasis of extant peace building thus becomes a technology of intervention, control, policing, security and projection of liberal internationalism. Even where liberal peace is a viable strategy for transforming post-conflict societies to achieve positive peace, key questions arise over its implementation, especially in relation to the sequencing and pacing of reforms and institutionalization.

237Brzoska, M. (2006). ‘Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations’, *International Peacekeeping*, 13(1), pp. 1–13.

238 Abdullah, I. (1998) ‘Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36, 2(1998), pp. 203–35.

239Fukuyama, F. (2005). *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*. London: ProfileBooks.

240 Last, D. (2000). *The Bergerhof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Germany: Bergerhof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.

241Zartman, I. (1995). ‘Posing the Problem of State Collapse’. In Zartman, I. (ed.), *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp. 1–14.

POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION MODELS AND FRAMEWORKS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS

Emerging Issues

In general, PCR involves the rebuilding of the socio-economic framework of society, and reconfiguring the enabling conditions for a better functioning peacetime society, using the framework of transparent governance and the rule of law. However, logical objections can be raised on the extent to which the process is actually post-war, given that such societies are often over-burdened by widespread human rights violations and tenuous peace agreements. As Ross contends, PCR emphasizes physical rebuilding of infrastructure, whereas the task at hand incorporates social re-engineering and rebuilding, what Putnam classified as positive social capital.²⁴² In addition, the elastic nature of most contemporary wars makes them less of single events with clear beginnings and endings, but rather of broader processes of social change that are turbulent and discontinuous, resulting from several contingent factors. Also, there remains considerable doubt about the immediate and long-term transition from the 'protest identity' formed by a majority of wartime actors or combatants, to the 'nationalistic' or 'peace' identities that are required for sustainable post-war recovery.²⁴³

Accordingly, PCR is conceptually tied to wider processes of peace building, marked as activities undertaken for the purpose of preventing, alleviating or resolving violent or potentially violent conflicts. It is also designed to reverse the destructive processes (negative social capital) that accompany prolonged violence; processes that occur before, during and after conflicts, and are a whole range of activities defined by the outcomes of civil wars.²⁴⁴ Such a conceptual operationalization vitiates concerns about the timing and physical limitations associated with PCR, as opposed to total rebuilding or transformation of peace building; it incorporates local actors, as opposed to suggesting that external actors alone are entrusted with the difficult task of rebuilding failed states; and finally, such a conceptual focus tends to carry less historical baggage.

In general, recent PCR agenda in Africa is anchored on four pillars: first, security sector reforms guarantee personal (human) and territorial security, indexed by targeted activities such as the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of former fighters; rebuilding and retraining the armed forces and the police; reviewing and formulating a new national defense doctrine and policy; and improving civil and democratic oversight and control of security institutions and personnel.²⁴⁵ Second, justice and reconciliation promote social healing, limit dissent and enhance recourse to non-violent means in the resolution of

242 Ross, D. (2004) *Violent Democracy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

243 Zanotti, L. (2006). Taming Chaos: A Foucauldian View of UN Peacekeeping, Democracy and Normalization, *International Peacekeeping*, 13(2), pp. 150–67.

244 Sriram, C. (2000). 'Truth Commissions and the Quest for Justice: Stability and Accountability after Internal Strife', *International Peacekeeping*, 7(4), pp. 91–106.

245 Richards, P. (1995). 'Rebellion in Liberia and Sierra Leone: A Crisis of Youth?' In Furley, O. (ed.), *Conflict in Africa*. London/New York: Tauris, pp. 134–70.

conflicts.²⁴⁶ These aspects are signposted by reform of the judicial and penal systems, and the setting up of a truth commission, and perhaps, a war crimes tribunal. Third, socio-economic reforms address fundamental needs such as employment, emergency relief, restoring essential services, and re-laying the economic foundation for growth and development. This phase could also witness the liberalization and privatization of state-owned assets.

The fourth pillar, political reform promotes good governance, rule of law and political participation through elections after the peace accords, the rebuilding of political institutions, the creation of legitimate and effective political and administrative systems and the involvement of civil society in governance processes. Recent PCR efforts, especially in Africa, stem from Krause and Jutersonke 'new wars' in sharp contrast to the inter-state conflicts that marked pre- 1990 PCR initiatives.²⁴⁷ What this suggests is that the geography or environment of recent PCR has also been significantly altered, shifting from the more industrially developed and militarily powerful states and regions of the world to the less powerful, less industrialized, less developed and militarily weak states and regions.

This transposition reflects fundamental changes in the structure and geography of warfare, with a seeming trade-off between inter-state and intra-state conflict, as conflicts become more 'affordable' to the poorer countries and regions of the world. Thus, while Western European states Britain, Germany, France, Poland and Italy were the major theatres of early twentieth century PCR, the poorer Third World countries, especially those in Africa; Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, etc. are either current or potential theatres of PCR.²⁴⁸

The ongoing PCR programmes are generally localized (that is, less tied to calculations about international security and inter-state commercial and geo-strategic interests) when compared to the earlier models. For instance, post-World Wars I and II reconstruction plans were essentially internationalist in outlook, seeking to link international security issues such as the demilitarization of certain countries, the imposition of reparations on vanquished countries as a deterrence against future aggression, and the outright partitioning of some countries, with PCR efforts.²⁴⁹ Conversely, PCR initiatives in Africa and elsewhere have been much more targeted (in part due to their intra-state as opposed to inter-state nature), seeking essentially to maintain the mythology of statehood rather than overseeing the partitioning or break-up of the affected countries.

246 Ryan, S. (2000). 'United Nations Peacekeeping: A Matter of Principles?' *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), pp. 27–47.

247 Krause, K. & Jutersonke, O. (2005). 'Peace, Security and Development in Post-Conflict Environments', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No.4, pp. 447–62.

248 ECOWAS (2001) *Protocol A/SP1/12/01 On Democracy and Good Governance*. Abuja: ECOWAS.

249 Chomsky, N. (2006) *Failed States: The Abuse of Power and Assault on Democracy*. London: Penguin.

PCR: Debates and Discourses

The human security and peace building paradigms were introduced at a conjuncture in which the African landscape was punctuated by civil wars characterized by violence against citizens, unspeakable acts of gender based violence, the emergence of child soldiers, large scale displacement of people with a severe impact on the structural, social and psychological fabric of the societies.²⁵⁰ The ushering in of many peace agreements over the past two decades have seen the formal conclusion of a number of these violent conflicts in Africa. However, it was the startling revelation that “between onequarter and one-third of peace agreements ending civil wars collapse within five years” that directed the international focus towards peace building.

There have also been a number of efforts, using different methods, to consolidate the peace in the countries involved. Frequently, peace building efforts have taken on a regional dimension, in an attempt to address the complex issue of zones of conflict, in which the intricate local networks of political and economic activity have been reshaped by years of violence. Resolving the changes in power relations that occur as a result of conflict, and providing for the restoration of state authority and the rule of law, lie at the base of many peace building initiatives, and seem to be a pre-requisite if a lasting civil peace is to be achieved and a return to violence avoided.

Unfortunately, those who have benefited from the “war economy” are more difficult to displace once formal peace agreements are concluded and, if anything, social distress continues to deepen following conflict. In Angola and Mozambique, the emergence from civil war undoubtedly was assisted by the democratization of South Africa, which removed one of the external sponsors of the rebellions in those countries.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, there is still a need to address the underlying regional, social and economic imbalances that also fuelled the conflicts in these two Lusophone states. In Angola, the dominance of a Luanda-based political and economic elite has delayed the distribution of the peace dividend across much of the country, where populations directly affected by the protracted civil war have been left largely to their own devices.²⁵²

The ruling party has consolidated its power and co-opted some of its erstwhile opponents, using state patronage to marginalize recalcitrants. Recent modifications to the constitution suggest a move to a more narrowly based presidential system in which parliamentary powers will be further eroded. The resultant narrowing of political space, however, though it may prevent any thought of a return to violent conflict, may be ill-suited to achieving a lasting

250Berdal, M. (1996) ‘Disarmament and Demobilisation after Civil Wars’, *Adelphi Paper* 303.

251Miall, H. et al. (1999) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution*. London: Polity Press.

252United Nations (1995) A Supplement to the Agenda for Peace, A/50/60-S/1995/1, 03 January 1995, <http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html>.

positive peace.²⁵³ In Mozambique, a similar process of political centralization has taken place following initial attempts to engage opposition forces in meaningful political participation. Attempts to address allegations of ruling party bias towards the capital and the south of the country have been countered by development efforts in north and centre, though these are also seen as attempts by the ruling party to extend its influence. In both Angola and Mozambique it is becoming almost impossible to distinguish the aims and operations of the ruling parties from those of the state.²⁵⁴

The Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) demonstrates similar dynamics. Here the end of the Angolan civil war and the ousting of Mobutu's regime in neighbouring Kinshasa allowed the government of President Sassou-Nguesso to deal with his armed opponents using a mixture of military force and political concessions.²⁵⁵ The rebellion in the Pool region is now largely over, but serious efforts will be required to achieve a sense of national unity based on regional equity. The challenge ahead will be to diversify economic and social development away from the oil sector and the capital. For the past twenty years at least, DRC has stood at the epicentre of what some regarded as Africa's first continental conflict. The accelerating disintegration of the Mobutu regime in the aftermath of the Cold War also inflamed a number of conflicts in surrounding countries and drew the national armies of many of these states into the civil wars that followed in the DRC.²⁵⁶

To some extent the tensions that gave rise to this situation remain unaddressed, except at a formal and superficial level. Though post-war elections have been held in DRC under the UN auspices there appears to have been only slow and partial progress towards the creation of an effective state machinery.²⁵⁷ The situation is particularly serious in the east of the country, though rapprochement with Rwanda and Uganda has defused cross-border tensions to a degree. Rebel movements continue to exercise a measure of control over territory and resources in the Kivus and the national army is still in its infancy. Effective peace building in the DRC will be a matter of decades rather than years, and involves addressing the concerns of numerous different communities at a local level to avoid the aggregation of micro-level conflicts into a broader conflict zone.²⁵⁸ The tensions between Kinshasa and other provincial power centres will remain a threat to the reconstitution of an effective state apparatus and will be exacerbated by the very uneven geographical distribution of natural resources.

253 Williams, P. (2004) 'Peace Operations and the International Financial Institutions: Insights from Rwanda and Sierra Leone', *International Peacekeeping*, 11(1), pp. 103–23.

254 Reilly, B. (2002). 'Post-Conflict Elections: Constraints and Dangers', *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2), pp. 118–39.

255 Keane, J. (2004) *Violence and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

256 Goodhand, J. & Sedra, M. (2007). 'Bribes or Bargains? Peace Conditionalities and "Post-Conflict" Reconstruction in Afghanistan', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 41–61.

257 Dobbins, J. (2003). *America's Role in Nationbuilding: From Germany to Iraq*. Santa Monica: RAND.

258 Guttal, S. (2005). 'The Politics of Post-war/Post-Conflict Reconstruction', *Development*, 48(3), pp. 73–81.

The introduction of a depoliticized legal and judicial system would also strike most Congolese as a novelty, but without it the administration of the state will remain hostage politicians. The withdrawal of MONUC, envisaged for 2011, also raises serious questions about the likelihood of a deepening of the chronic instability in the East.²⁵⁹ In Rwanda, the aftermath of the genocidal war of 1994 has seen the restoration of peace under a system of authoritarian democracy.²⁶⁰ The government of Rwanda has adopted a consciously developmentalist approach in an attempt to address the problems of resource scarcity that helped trigger communal violence over the years. Again, the difficulties that may emerge in the longer term are probably related to the pressures to open the democratic space, to achieve broad reconciliation at the same time as allowing for the reintegration of refugee communities.

In Burundi the formal peace process will be tested by the next electoral competition, which will pitch formal enemies against each other in a peaceful contest for political power. The stakes are perceived to be high, and the possible formation of party militias constitutes a real danger to the civil peace. As in Rwanda, though with a less well-focused government, Burundi faces long-term problems associated with resource scarcity and the return of large refugee populations that will need to be addressed. Burundi's population remains in the grip of pernicious poverty, which the advent of formal peace may do little to alleviate without more determined development policy measures.²⁶¹ Another post-conflict zone is to be found in the Horn of Africa. The border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea ended almost ten years ago, but there has been no successful demarcation of the disputed border, despite protracted international diplomatic effort and arbitration. Tensions remain high around the disputed area, and the expenses and other distractions of maintaining a high level of military preparedness prevents the two states from dealing more effectively with profound internal developmental problems. In addition, their mutual enmity has spilled over into the largely collapsed state of Somalia, whose intractable conflict has been fed by this proxy war.²⁶²

The globalization of the Somali conflict is one of the most worrying developments of recent times, and makes it difficult to anticipate the beginning of post-conflict peace building in this impoverished region. Across the Horn of Africa, impoverished communities, their lot exacerbated by the scourge of conflict, are also challenged on a recurring basis by a fickle climate. Drought and famine are common phenomena here, their deadliness aggravated by conflict and forces displacement. The cycle of poverty can be interrupted, but only if

259 IRIN News (2007) "GUINEA: Soldiers Continue Looting after President Concedes to Demands", <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=72138>.

260 Galtung, J. (2004). 'A Structural Theory of Aggression', *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 2, pp. 95–119.

261 Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

262 Hamre, J. & Sullivan, G. (2002). 'Towards Post- Conflict Reconstruction', *Washington Quarterly*, 25(2002), pp. 85–96.

economic and social development is allowed to emerge as priorities.²⁶³ Sudan's civil wars have also had major regional ramifications. At present the Comprehensive Political Agreement (CPA) between the National Congress Party and the Sudanese Peoples Liberation Movement is slowly being implemented, and a best case scenario is that the elections in April 2010 and the Referendum on South Sudan's future in January 2011 will go ahead as planned.²⁶⁴

Whatever the decision of the South Sudanese about their future, functioning relations between North and South will remain essential. Given the underdeveloped nature of the South economically, infrastructurally and administratively peace building here will be a long and expensive process. Should South Sudan choose independence in 2011, many of the problems it will confront will not be unlike those facing a "failed state", and the exacerbation of local communal conflict cannot be ruled out. Elsewhere in Sudan's national territory, the rebellion in the Red Sea region has been ended by a political compact, but much still needs to be done to consolidate the peace. The Nuba Mountains also remain an area of acute concern. The Darfur conflict has now transformed into a desultory military campaign, but huge population displacements and cross-border complications have drawn it into the domestic problems of both Chad and the Central African Republic.

A regional solution to the conflict is urgently needed across the vast and undergoverned spaces of this war zone. In West Africa most post-conflict peace building has centred on the states of the Mano River Union.²⁶⁵ Massive efforts continue to be made to restore some semblance of functioning and responsible government to the war-torn countries of Sierra Leone and Liberia. In both cases, instability in neighbouring states could easily spill over to undo the slow but steady progress being made. Developments in Guinea, where the death of President Lansana Conté precipitated a military coup followed by dangerous divisions within the security forces are especially threatening, though recent agreements brokered by other regional actors may avert disaster. Guinea Bissau has scarcely known stability since independence, and over the past twelve years relations between the military and the civilian political class have been fraught and occasionally murderous.

Though the unrest of early 2009 has now abated, there are structural problems with state capacity and the penetration of wealthy and powerful foreign narcotic syndicates that use Guinea Bissau as a conduit to European markets.²⁶⁶ This development constitutes a novel danger to Guinea Bissau, its neighbors and beyond. The situation in Côte d'Ivoire will also impact upon the general prospects for peace building in the West African region and even a

263 Chandler, D. (2004). 'The Responsibility to Protect? Imposing the Liberal Peace', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 59–81.

264 Fanthorpe, R. (2005). 'On the Limits of Liberal Peace: Chiefs and Democratic Decentralization in Postwar Sierra Leone', *African Affairs*, 105/148, pp. 27–49.

265 Bellamy, A. (2004). 'The Next Stage in Peace Operations Theory?' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 17–38.

266 Collier, P. & Hoeffler, A. (2002). 'Aid, Policy and Peace: Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict', *Defence and Peace Economics*, Vol. 13(6), pp. 435–50.

popularly elected government will be hard pressed to undertake the business of national reconstruction so urgently needed after the violent political upheavals of the past decade. The recent electoral impasse in the country and the problems created by continued postponement of elections aptly demonstrates this fact.

The protracted political crisis in Madagascar has drawn more external attention to that country than it has been wont to receive since independence. The current issues can be traced to the giant island's structural and developmental problems, which became evident during the contested succession of President Ravolomanana and the subsequent exile of his predecessor, Didier Ratsiraka. Issues of uneven development and unfulfilled expectations, combined with a degree of political ineptitude led to the ousting of Ravolomanana by the youthful and populist mayor of Antananarivo, Andry Rajoelina, in 2009. This coup was widely condemned, and towards the end of 2009, diplomatic attempts to resolve the impasse appeared to have borne fruit, only for Rajoelina to renege on the agreements made.²⁶⁷ The failure of the power-sharing arrangements will make it that much harder to generate confidence in similar mechanisms in future. A broader peace building process, incorporating but not limited to political concerns, thus seems the most sensible way forwards.

This brief overview of the conflict and post-conflict environments in Africa reveals the continued fragility of a number of African states and tenuousness of peace processes and stability at large. The return of unconstitutional changes in government, as recently witnessed in Mauritania, Guinea, Madagascar and Niger, are indicative of this tenuousness. It is therefore imperative that emphasis remains on creating human security and sustainable positive peace building architectures, principles and practices.²⁶⁸ Key to this has to be that peace building initiatives are inclusive and draws on local knowledge, resources and practices.

The Absence of Political Will

This sketch of long term development issues represents a summary and highly selective treatment of areas where social welfare and development strategies are most directly tied to action to further peace and stability. They illustrate how numerous are the interactions and possible areas for intervention, and how much uncertainty remains on critical issues of cause and effect where social dynamics are concerned.²⁶⁹ The central question that can be posed is: what strategic direction and what priority actions stand the best chance of helping to reinforce social peace and welfare and, hopefully, at the same time, prevent violence and conflict? There are plainly no ready answers, no formulas, and few pitfalls that are not well known. On issue after issue, attention turns to the questions of how (far more than whether or even when) lofty and worthy goals can be achieved.

267 Addison, T. (2003). *Africa's Recovery from Conflict: Making Peace Work for the Poor*. Helsinki: UNUWIDER. Orders Corruption Probe", available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7141891.stm>.

268 Henry, P. (2002). *Problems of Post War Reconstruction*. Washington: American Council on Public Affairs.

269 Jones, S. (2005). *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict*. Santa Monica: RAND.

The role that the state plays: both how broadly its mandate is defined and how it is organized to deliver, leads in turn to a focus on institutions and capacity, and on implementation, as opposed to vision, conception, and design.²⁷⁰ It is striking that George Soros has focused so sharply on institutional issues in his recent commentary on “The Capitalist Threat”. In a wide variety of situations the path from discussion of stability and inequality leads to a discussion of the importance of rule of law and to assurance of a solid regulatory framework and transparent information systems.

In several specific country situations where reintegration strategies and protection goals are the primary objectives, UNHCR staff highlights the development of judicial and legal institutions as a central policy issue. South Africa, in Chad, in northern Mali, in Colombia, legal institutions are seen as a primary avenue to managing and resolving tensions within societies.²⁷¹ Reforms in regulatory systems and in information systems lie at the heart of what has come to be known as “second generation” reforms, those that succeed the “stroke of the pen” initial macroeconomic measures that set an economy back on a stable and growth path. The basic need for sound institutions emerges in virtually every field. The conclusions highlighted in Rubinstein’s analysis of ethnic inequalities, illustrate the significance that institutional reform has come to assume.²⁷²

The primary if not only instrument for lessening negative repercussions of ethnic tensions in a sound legal system with clear protections offered for rights of minorities. In analysis after analysis, the issues return to the question of institutions and their capacity to work effectively to resolve differences within society, to gather, use and convey information, to support individual and market efforts. Institutional development and capacity building underlie a large part of development efforts, and are interwoven in every facet of development work, whether it is a president convening a cabinet conference to review strategic options (as Mali’s President, for example, has done on several occasions), a civil service reform effort, aimed at introducing better incentive systems, a tax systems reform, a program to encourage health workers to live closer to rural clients, or teacher training efforts.²⁷³ This said, much more can and needs to be done to translate the stated objectives of making institutions work better into lasting results. This constitutes both the best hope for linking knowledge and ideas on how to enhance social welfare and help promote more stable societies where conflicts are resolved fairly and peacefully, into real results.

270 Richmond, O. (2004). ‘UN Peace Operations and the Dilemmas of the Peacebuilding Consensus’, *International Peacekeeping* 11(1), pp. 83–101.

271 SIPRI (2002) *SIPRI Year Book 2002: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

272 Rubinstein, R. (2005). ‘Intervention and Culture: An Anthropological Approach to Peace Operations’, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 527–44.

273 Ramsbotham, O. (2000) ‘Reflections on UN Post-Settlement Peacebuilding’, *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), pp. 169–89.

There are examples of societies that have achieved at least part of this ideal. The case of Asian societies like Taiwan and Malaysia, where national strategies have for decades accentuated the dual role of social capital and public institutions as a foundation for rapid growth is a case in point. The success of societies like Botswana and Mauritius also owe much to their development of capacity. Examples of failure, sadly, are much more numerous, with Zaire's institutional bankruptcy the most immediate and telling illustration of the consequences of weak institutions. Governance may be the most discussed issue in the development field in the mid-1990s, and one of the most poorly understood.²⁷⁴ This can be traced in large measure to the tendency to bundle so many issues together into a single term. Different groups have adopted the word "governance," which has an ancient derivation and etymology, to refer to several different phenomena on the contemporary scene. Thus the term "governance" has taken on a character of code where the same word is used to connote several different if related phenomena.²⁷⁵

The system's ability to "throw the rascals out" is seen as key. Some non-governmental organizations use the term to refer to the specific issue of human rights, particularly as it is manifested in violence against minority groups or political opposition. Because freedom of information is viewed by many as an essential corollary of good government, press freedom is cited by some as a central governance issue. In other quarters governance is used quite specifically to refer to corruption (or its absence). Finally, in the broadest use of the term (and that most often employed within the World Bank), it refers to effective government, transparent, with effective participation, and ensuring clear rules of the game. These facets of governance certainly pose quite separate questions and problems.²⁷⁶ Each topic has separate importance. There are nonetheless elements that each governance facet shares with others, and in important respects all come together in reflecting broad choices about the role of the state and the authority and legitimacy it enjoys to exercise power.

State-building is seen as a decisive factor for stabilization and the translation of early recovery activities into long-term development. The restoration of the state's capability should include the creation of professional public administration and civil service, the establishment of mechanisms for oversight, accountability and financial controls as well as the rebuilding of representative and inclusive political institutions. The restoration of critical attributes of functioning states like authority, legitimacy and effectiveness is usually accepted to be long term and depends on specific political dynamics in each country. The failure of the social contract and its reestablishment is the basic rationale for state-building. State-building is advocated since states are often very much involved in the onset of conflicts and state fragility is a key reason for violent conflict. State-building is closely related to the concept of governance. In the context of worldwide national regime transitions and democratisation

274 Keen, D. (2008). *Complex Emergencies*. London: Polity Press.

275 Olonisakin, F. (2000). 'Reinventing Peacekeeping in Africa. Conceptual and Legal Issues in ECOMOG Operations'. Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International.

276 Mani, R. (2005) 'Rebuilding an Inclusive Political Community after War', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. (4), pp. 511-26.

efforts in the early 1990s, the concept of governance has played a formative role informing development theory and policy.²⁷⁷ In particular, the concept of ‘good governance’ has been promoted by the World Bank and other development organisations.

The focus has been shifted from the role of the market to the importance of sound public institutions to provide the preconditions for development and economic growth. In the context of early post-conflict, second-best institutions may be the only objective which is achievable. Recent research has criticized the state-building approach of most policy frameworks to transfer Western universal values of the state and democracy to remedy local problems in post-conflict situations. Social practices, values as well as political traditions might only weakly match universal values of state-building activities. State building policies are wrongly oriented towards the Western-style Weberian-Westphalian sovereign state instead of integrating hybrid political orders in policy formulation and implementation.²⁷⁸ Moreover, state-building has the difficult task of balancing the respect for deeply embedded political and economic structures with the need to introduce new approaches.

Donor Interests

During the subsequent half-century, the end to conflicts in many parts of the world has seen a call on development institutions to move urgently to support the rebuilding of infrastructure and institutions and thus help cement the peace. These interventions have taken many forms, along a continuum ranging from classic emergency aid, generally directed at direct victims of violence, through the broad array of investment actions that merge into classic development finance operations per se. The framework for discussing PCR has taken on important new dimensions in the period since 1989, in large measure as a result of the vast geopolitical shifts that have taken place.²⁷⁹ As the nature of conflicts has shifted, so have the challenges of PCR. The explosive demands for humanitarian aid (which consumes a rapidly rising share of funds going to development assistance), the disruptions of populations on all continents through refugee flows, and the cyclical trends of violent outbreaks in several regions of the world present a new set of problems to leaders in virtually all segments of the international community.

The tasks of rebuilding battered nations, cementing reconciliation, and redirecting development to avert future conflicts are thus much more central challenges for the development institutions today than they were a decade ago.²⁸⁰ An active international debate is underway that aims to enhance and clarify the roles of different institutions in these various activities and, overall, to find better formulas to build peace and help avoid recurrence or outbreaks of conflict. This catalogue of evolving roles carries no implication whatsoever that

277Blagojevic, B. (2007) ‘Peacebuilding in Ethnically Divided Societies’, *Peace Review*, 19(4), pp. 555–62.

278Duffield, M. (2001) *Global Governance and the New Wars*. London/New York: Zed Books.

279Dobbins, J. (2007) *The Beginner’s Guide to Nation-Building*. Santa Monica: RAND.

280Yannis, A. (2003) ‘State Collapse and its Implications for Peace Building and Reconstruction’. In Milliken, J. (ed.), *State Failure, Collapse and Reconstruction*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 63–82

the World Bank is optimally or uniquely placed to carry out these functions.²⁸¹ A common characteristic of recent post-conflict situations is the varying roles that different actors play, both over different time periods, and from situation to situation. In the immediate post-conflict situation, for example, national governments and regional associations, together or in parallel with the United Nations, are likely to be key actors.

In situations where massive population movements are at issue, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees assumes a central role. In the emergency phase, the extraordinary dedication, nimbleness, and organizational skills of some of the humanitarian non-governmental organizations play critical roles as a neutral, people-focused vehicle for action. National government peace-keeping efforts may give way to aid-focused actions, as for example the Scandinavian support for Southern African countries emerging from conflict has laid a foundation for grounded and effective development support. The United Nations Development Program bridges the United Nations agency roles, from Peace-keeping to the specialized agencies like UNICEF, the World Food Program, and the FAO.²⁸²

Another major component of current PCR is the frequent use of special conferences or donor conferences to mobilize international political, diplomatic and financial support for peace processes, and to harmonize differing perspectives among key external actors. Accordingly, PCR is implemented by a consortium of agencies: international organizations, international aid agencies, international and local NGOs (acting as sub-contractors and executors for Western NGOs) and favoured or cooperative political elites.²⁸³ This last point brings out the final component of post PCR: they tend to be largely driven from outside. In other words, external actors tend to dominate the designing, financing and implementation of reconstruction programmes in countries emerging from civil wars. Indeed, there is considerable evidence of externalization, in spite of the professed objective of promoting local ownership, building domestic capacity and adapting programmes and resources to suit local capacities. The retinue of highly remunerated experts, technocrats, consultants and contractors involved in economic, political, institutional and security reforms and in the delivery of psychosocial therapy, are good examples of this phenomenon.

Concern for the impact of humanitarian aid should not be narrowly restricted to the project level. There is a need for greater investment in system-wide evaluations that can ask difficult but important questions about the responsibility for humanitarian outcomes, and the broader political dimensions within which the humanitarian system operates in terms of vested

281 Williams, R. (2000). 'Africa and the Challenges of Security Sector Reform'. In Cilliers, J. and A. Hilding-Norberg (eds), *Building Stability in Africa: Challenges for the new millennium*. ISS Monograph. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies.

282 Dobbins, J. (2003). 'America's Role in Nationbuilding: From Germany to Iraq', *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 4, Winter 2003-04, pp. 87-110.

283 Heathershaw, J. (2007). 'Peace building as Practice: Discourses from Post-conflict Tajikistan', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 219-36.

interests beside humanitarian goodwill.²⁸⁴ Politically, the humanitarian context remains in the shadow of Western geostrategic counter-terror and 'stabilisation' efforts, and corresponding anti-Western movements in various parts of the developing world. For much of the past decade, several humanitarian responses have taken place in contested settings in which the major donors to the humanitarian system are also parties to conflict and seek to advance political and strategic aims, which often unavoidably overlap or conflict with humanitarian objectives. Continued suspicion of or outright hostility to humanitarian actors perceived as aligned with Western agendas exacerbates access and security constraints to aid operations. This is particularly acute in Somalia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Sudan.²⁸⁵

Donors, for both ideological and domestic political reasons, have increasingly framed the role of humanitarian assistance within a broader policy framework of interventions which include defence, international security and stabilisation of failed or failing states to prevent further conflict or support for terrorist movements.²⁸⁶ The events of the Arab spring add a new element of uncertainty and politicisation to humanitarian responses for civilians affected by conflict.²⁸⁷ By contrast, in the humanitarian contexts that is outside the Western focus on terrorism such as the Central African Republic and Cote d'Ivoire where the problem is one of limited geostrategic relevance and consequent neglect.²⁸⁸

Other Issues

The very name of the World Bank recalls its original objective of PCR. Its official title, IBRD, stands for the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.²⁸⁹ Although the initial mandate of providing the financing of post-World War II reconstruction in Europe was largely subsumed by the US-sponsored Marshall Plan, and the World Bank moved toward a broader mandate of supporting development in less prosperous countries, the post-conflict role has remained important in many situations.²⁹⁰ Time and time again the World Bank has played a central role in mobilizing the large volume of finance that is needed to rebuild after the destruction of war.

284 Macrae, J. and N. Leader (2000) *The Politics of Coherence: Humanitarianism and Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era*. HPG Briefing Paper 1. London: ODI.

285 Montreux Group (2002) *Donors Retreat on the CAP and the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergencies*, 28 February–1 March 2002, Montreux, Switzerland.

286 Global Humanitarian Assistance. (2009). Summary GHA Report 2009. London: Development Initiatives.

287 Global Humanitarian Assistance. (2009). Summary GHA Report 2009. London: Development Initiatives.

288 Schnabel, A. (2002). 'Post-Conflict Peace building and Second-Generation Preventive Action', *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2), pp. 7–30.

289 Simonsen, S. (2004). 'Nation-building as Peacebuilding: Racing to Define the Kosovar', *International Peacekeeping*, 11(2), pp. 289–311.

290 Fetherston, A. (2000). 'Peacekeeping, Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding: A Reconsideration of Theoretical Frameworks', *International Peacekeeping*, 7(1), pp. 190–218.

A further change is the powerful impetus of modern global communications systems and the media as they interplay with conflict situations. The graphic and immediate images of suffering that are now available to large parts of the world population suggest a call for action, sooner not later. Another change is the multitude of actors who are involved in many situations as outside partners: business, international institutions, and non-governmental organizations.²⁹¹ Many or all of these groups call attention to needs and work to aid victims of conflict; they exhibit an ever increasing interest in ensuring that the immediate, humanitarian support they provide will lead to lasting, sustainable support that will bridge the gulf between misery and a good quality of life. In this new environment, the World Bank is still called on to play its traditional role, of financing reconstruction, but that is only part of the picture. It is increasingly called upon to play a growing set of new roles. These vary considerably from case to case and are crafted to meet the needs of emerging situations. The large and, sadly, growing numbers of conflict situations and rising needs for humanitarian and peace-keeping support are placing increasing demands on the international community, and the development finance institutions per se.²⁹²

The traditional, and perhaps first motive for a call to the World Bank to intervene has been to provide or help mobilize the staggering sums of money that are required to rebuild infrastructure and “jump-start” an economy after the destruction of war. Financing is critically needed for reconstruction, and the World Bank is well placed both to finance investments directly and to help mobilize and coordinate aid.²⁹³ There are three difficulties that can arise: the amounts of money required for reconstruction after a war far exceed the “norms” of financing that are traditionally allocated for countries, based on needs, equity, poverty, or demonstrated performance. This applies to the World Bank but also to most other development institutions. Special consideration and treatment are needed to mobilize and orchestrate the financing packages that reconstruction calls for; when a country had fallen into arrears in payment to the international financial institutions, the policies of these institutions do not allow new financing, and at a certain stage, without exception, disbursements for ongoing operations are suspended. This is the case now in Liberia, Zaire and Sudan, for example.²⁹⁴ Special international efforts are needed to meet the amounts of arrears so that operations can resume. Examples of such efforts include the countries of former Yugoslavia.

To date, the most elaborate examples of a concerted international effort, spearheaded by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, and implemented over a period of years,

291 Dzelilovic, V. (2002) ‘World Bank, NGOs and the Private Sector in Post-war Reconstruction’, *International Peacekeeping*, 9(2), pp. 81–98.

292 Natsios, A. (2005) ‘The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development’, *Parameters*, Autumn 2005, pp. 4–20.

293 Mani, R. (2005) ‘Balancing Peace with Justice in the Aftermath of Violent Conflict’, *Development* 48(3), pp. 25–34.

294 Joseph, R. (1999). ‘The Reconfiguration of Power in Late Twentieth-Century Africa’. In Joseph, R. (ed.), *State, Conflict and Democracy in Africa*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner, pp. 57–82.

are the debt workout plans for Peru and Zambia.²⁹⁵ In both cases the programs allowed development finance operations to resume after protracted period of suspension because of arrears. These and other instances show that even seemingly intractable problems can be resolved and offer some indications of the type of financing mechanisms that are available. Beyond the financing role, there are at least four other areas where the World Bank has become involved in post-conflict situations. Perhaps most significant is the support that the World Bank can lend in Strategic and Policy Planning. The World Bank, with its goldmine of information, networks and experience in economic and social development issues, can play a central role in strategic thinking as leaders and outside partners turn to the task of reconstruction and development. The Bank can provide rapid, objective analysis of socioeconomic issues and options and define the economic and social tools that can guide decision-making.²⁹⁶ Specialists across disciplines, with the objectivity and “outsider” status afforded by an international institution, can mobilize vast worldwide resources of experiences, good and bad, across economic issues and sectors. The capacity to mobilize, rapidly, interdisciplinary teams of specialists and to harness networks of people with experience of virtually any problem, and access to a vast array of partners, public and private, international and national, business and not for profit in focus can fill a vast void in a country emerging from crisis and seeking to trace the path forward.

Countries in a post-conflict situation need both to build new Aid Partnerships and to coordinate large numbers of actors, many accustomed to operating with considerable autonomy in the country during times of crisis. The World Bank has experience, expertise and a “known” role in helping to build the complex partnerships that are needed to finance and support the mammoth efforts involved in restarting an economy. The Consultative Group and Aid Consortium mechanisms offer excellent precedents for the aid partnerships needed in post-conflict situations. These are flexible partnerships, organized to fit the needs of the specific country, which meet as needed under the chairmanship of the World Bank, often jointly with the country concerned, and involving the most active bilateral and multilateral institutions.²⁹⁷ The formula of meetings allows all parties to have a comprehensive picture of the development strategy and financing needs of the country, to pose questions, and to share information about the respective aid activities in the country. These aid coordination mechanisms can also be used as continuing information sharing mechanism and a framework within which specific sectoral or other special coordination mechanisms can be organized.

Countries emerging from conflicts face a multitude of problems, many of which are characteristic of post-conflict situations. Clear technical and policy guidance, including raw information on what other countries have done, is hard to come by. The World Bank has

295 Coyne, C. (2006). ‘Reconstructing Weak and Failed States’, *The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 2 Summer 2006, pp. 143–62.

296 Schwarz, R. (2005). ‘Post-Conflict Peace building: The Challenges of Security, Welfare and Representation’, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 429–46.

297 Ismail, O. (2003). *The Day After: Child Soldiers in Post-war Sierra Leone*. Report submitted to the SSRC, New York, African Youth in the Era of Globalization Fellowship Programme.

thus come to play an increasingly important role in providing Policy and Technical Support on Post-Conflict Issues.²⁹⁸ As experience with post-conflict programs grows, the World Bank has the capacity to offer, in usable, operational form, specific experience from elsewhere in the world that can help policy makers in the throes of post-conflict challenges, whether the issue is design of programs for demobilization of soldiers, privatization of a munitions industry, costs and priorities within a nationwide demining campaign, a social action program that can serve war-battered communities, or building a nongovernmental coalition to support child-victims of war.²⁹⁹

A characteristic of post-conflict situations is policy vacuums in many sectors and large holes in analytic work. The World Bank has vast and deep-rooted experience and expertise in these areas and thus can provide substantial support with socioeconomic data and tools for analysis. The massive evidence that is now available or can be gathered relatively quickly about social development and social consequences of policy change may well serve in situations of conflict to help forge an earlier and stronger peace.³⁰⁰ Bringing data on social costs of wars, in graphic yet objective forms, may in some instances contribute to the impetus for peace and help shape the consensus and agreements formed. This was the objective of World Bank efforts in Angola to highlight the impact and implications of the dramatic slide in social indicators, and the immense costs of rebuilding, and thus urge civic and Government leaders to push social and economic objectives high up the list as they worked for peace and reconciliation.³⁰¹

Reinventing the State in Africa

Ake did not use the concepts of ‘peace building’ and ‘state reconstruction’ with reference to ‘post-conflict Africa,’ which are central to this study.³⁰² Nor did his reflections and writings directly address the issue of ‘reinventing the state in post-conflict Africa,’ but they did illuminate the debate on the challenges confronting Africa in a post-Cold War world. Ake’s writings at this time (1997) focused on the challenges posed to post-Cold War Africa by intra-state conflicts and crises, particularly those related to complex humanitarian emergencies.

Although the continent recorded remarkable achievements in multiparty democratisation and economic reform, the significance of the 1990s for sub-Saharan Africa lies in ‘the

298 Dodge, T. (2006). ‘Iraq: The Contradictions of Exogenous State-building in Historical Perspective’, *Third World Quarterly*, 27(1), pp. 187–200.

299 ICG (2003) ‘Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance’, *Africa Report*, No. 67, 02 September 2003.

300 Darby, J. (2006). ‘The Post-Accord Context’. In Darby, J. (ed.), *Violence and Reconstruction*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 1–10.

301 Freeman, C. (2007). ‘Introduction: Security, Governance and Statebuilding in Afghanistan’, *International Peacekeeping*, 14(1), pp. 1–7.

302 Arowosegbe, O. (2010). *Reflections on the Challenge of Reconstructing Post-Conflict States in West Africa, Insights From Claude Ake’s Political Writings*.

coincidence of the transformation in the international system with a profound internal crisis of the state in the continent'. Lederach analyses the implications of Africa's exploitation, marginalisation and poverty driven by both local and global forces for the conflicts and wars in the region.³⁰³ Although his works provide only limited coverage of 'peace building' and 'state reconstruction' in 'post-conflict Africa,' which only took centre stage a few years before his sudden death in 1996, nevertheless, some of his contributions and insights can be linked to ongoing debates and reflections on 'peacebuilding' and 'state reconstruction' in 'post-conflict Africa.' His major contribution in this regard relates to his critique of the state in Africa, especially the unique features of the state and their implications for the continent. He traced the history of the state in Africa to colonialism and capitalist penetration, and the eventual political legacy of colonialism for the continent. And, following his 'limited autonomy thesis' and the characterisation of the 'social formations in Africa' as a colonial creation, Olonisakin describes them as best understood as 'states in formation' and faults the process of 'state formation' on the continent.³⁰⁴

According to Pouligny, in spite of the formal independence of the state in Africa, the colonial character, inimical to development, still characterises the post-colonial state. Arguing that much is fundamentally wrong with the present composition of the state in Africa, he concludes that the state in Africa cannot deliver on the expectations of statehood unless it is fundamentally transformed.³⁰⁵ Adebajo argues that 'the rudimentary development of the state form in Africa' underlines the Hobbesian character of political struggles usually based on relations of raw power among contending groups and social classes in which right is co-extensive with power and security depends solely on the control of state power.³⁰⁶ This, he says, inhibits equality, formal freedom and competitive politics. It also undermines the legitimisation of power a problem underlying the crises of authority and nation-building on the continent given the personalised use of the state's coercive resources.

The rudimentary development of the state form in Africa engenders the problem of contradictions and conflicts of the socio-economic formation. The possibility of resolving contradictions is severely limited as the differences between groups in struggle are misrepresented as absolute. These exacerbate 'the problem of political instability for which Africa is deservedly notorious. In another account, Bello avers that: The state is burdened with onerous responsibilities which it is hardly in a position to fulfil.³⁰⁷ In particular, it is

303Lederach, J. (2003) *The Little Book of Conflict Transformation*. Intercourse: Good Books.

304Olonisakin, F. (2008). *Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone: The Story of UNAMSIL*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienner for International Peace Academy.

305Pouligny, B. (2005). 'Civil Society and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: Ambiguities of International Programmes Aimed at Building "New" Societies', *Security Dialogue* Vol. 36(4), pp. 495–510.

306Adebajo, A. (2002). 'Liberia: A Warlord's Peace'. In Stedman, J., D. Rothchild and E. Cousens (eds), *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder/London: International Peace Academy and the Centre for International Security and Cooperation: Lynne Rienner, pp. 599–631.

307Bello, W. (2006). 'The Rise of the Relief-and- Reconstruction Complex', *Columbia Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 59, No. 2, pp. 281–96.

supposed to undertake economic development in the face of a weak or non-existent entrepreneurial class. Along with that daunting challenge, it is also expected to undertake state-building, nation-building and political integration. The problem is that these are tasks which presuppose the absence of the state or its rudimentary existence. Somewhat incongruously, a fledging state is expected to tame the anarchy of complex heterogeneities and their immanent centrifugality when it is ludicrously weak. Quietly, this is an improbable proposition.

As a way out of its current crises, Montgomery and Rondinelli recommends the autochthonous transformation of the state as a recipe for improving its capacity and institutions.³⁰⁸ One approach to this is to rethink our understanding of colonialism and its legacies for the continent, the role of multinational capital, dependent capitalism, the centralisation of power as well as the impact of corrupt and authoritarian elites in Africa. He presents democratisation as the most salient option for addressing the norm-less struggles over state power, ethnic conflict, resource wars and Africa's humanitarian emergencies. In the context of McMullin, one understands the historic fault lines in Africa's experience with state formation.³⁰⁹ In this connection, the failure to transform the character of the state on the continent in spite of formal political independence engenders conflict over state power and the resources that access to state power offers.

Wentges harped insistently on 'now' as the temporal horizon for action, but far from being transcended; this failure is still very much with us.³¹⁰ Twentieth century anticolonial demands for self-rule in Africa achieved the vision of 'a quasi-independent state' but failed to transform the structures of the colonial state or imagine alternative conceptions of nationhood and statehood independent of the European model. The modern state has everywhere in Africa been patterned on the European model, with all its contradictions for the post-colony. Put differently, the historical patterns and global conditions which gave rise to the state in Africa have not been fundamentally altered. This is a major limitation of the nationalist response to the colonial intervention. It explains the continent's vulnerability to ideological and policy tinkering by neo-imperial brains trusts, with all their hard-nosed arguments on the lack of development in Africa. It also explains why the post-colonial state in its present form has been ineffectual, embattled and hounded into several reform programmes by the external donor community and international financial institutions. With neoliberalism, the wheel has only come full circle.

State-building in Africa therefore operates within the framework of a borrowed knowledge system whose representational structure corresponds to the very structure of power, which

308Montgomery, J. &Rondinelli, D. (2004). 'A Path to Reconstruction: Proverbs of Nation-building', *Harvard International Review*, Summer 2004, pp. 26–9.

309McMullin, J. (2004). 'Reintegration of Combatants: Were the Right Lessons Learned in Mozambique?' *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 625–43.

310Wentges, J. (2008). 'Force, Function and Phase: Three Dimensions of UN Peacekeeping', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 58–77.

intellectual and nationalist leaders on the continent seek to repudiate.³¹¹ The anti-colonial vision has been influential throughout the post-colonial world, instituting the foundations of modern critiques of socially unjust practices of caste, oppression of women, lack of rights for labouring and subaltern classes, and of colonialism itself. However, it has been ineffectual in erecting the foundations of an independent state free of neo-imperial dominance and capable of delivering on the expectations of a truly developmental state.

Thus, nationalism may have succeeded in liberating the nation from colonialism but not from the knowledge system of the West, which continues to dominate the continent. Through their opposition to colonialism, nationalist elites in Africa checked a specific political form of metropolitan capitalist dominance. Although they rejected the dominant rhetoric such as the civilising mission of the West ‘the white man’s burden’ they ignored the need for an epistemological revolution in the Western knowledge system on which the operations of the state are premised.³¹² While the lessons of decolonisation and what it means for world history are irreversible, this failure explains the continued dominance of the continent by the knowledge system of the West in the post-colonial era.

Hazen establishes a connection between ‘knowledge-production,’ ‘state-building’ and ‘development’ on the continent, and bemoans the ‘poverty of ideas’ with which state-building has been undertaken since decolonisation.³¹³ Put together, his works indicate that democratisation cannot ignore the character of the state. After all, the colonial state was not just the agency that brought the modular forms of the modern state to the colonies, it was also the agency destined never to fulfil its normalising mission in the post-colony. And the post-colonial state throughout Africa and Asia has ‘only expanded and not transformed the basic institutional arrangements of colonial law and administration, of the courts, the bureaucracy, the police, the army and the various technical services of government’.

Africa inherited the European system of government and administration in its original form based on ‘imitated’ constitutional principles, ‘borrowed’ technologies of power and administration, merely replacing the personnel. The elites of the ‘new states’ could not think of an entirely new system. Having replicated the Western model, the state in Africa remains an imposed institution inappropriate to the conditions of Africa. This way, decolonisation foreclosed other significant alternatives that were once at the centre of attention, such as supranational federations and pan-Africanism, and put in place a kind of state headed by a ruling class conscious of its own interests and fragility. The failure by successive regimes on

311 Last, D. (2000). *The Bergerhof Handbook for Conflict Transformation*. Germany: Bergerhof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management

312 Brzoska, M. (2006). ‘Introduction: Criteria for Evaluating Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Security Sector Reform in Peace Support Operations’, *International Peacekeeping*, 13(1), pp. 1–13.

313 Hazen, J. (2007). ‘Can Peacekeepers be Peacebuilders?’ *International Peacekeeping* Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 323–38.

the continent to see to the reality of change in this regard is what Borer describes as ‘the pitfalls of national consciousness.’³¹⁴

CONCLUSIONS

The study contends that the conception and practice of contemporary peace building in Africa is largely skewed towards the domestic and international priorities of interveners, mostly extra- African actors. Therefore, the impact of such interventions includes the alienation of the interests of the masses in post-conflict societies and, worse still, the superficial treatment of the roots of conflict that does not go beyond the stabilization and security of the post-war government. What this does is to increase the risk of the reintegration of post-conflict societies into the vicious cycle of the prewar situation, and the putting at grave risk of an already fragile post-conflict “peace”.

It is important to note that the foregoing analysis underscores the organic connections between the meaning, tools and practice of PCR in Africa and global patterns. Therefore, the extant forms and practices of peace building in the sub-region are more likely to achieve negative PCR because of international humanitarianism, as well as to ensure regime stability that reduces the risk of international terrorism. However, they are unlikely to achieve sustainable peace and transform the structures of violence inherent in certain interactions, socio-political relations and practices in the African region. All internal conflicts, especially civil wars, involve serious costs: human, social and material. All wars also leave a legacy that the countries that have experienced them share: weakening of the capacity to eradicate their causes without external assistance, both financial and technical. As a result, the donors as well as the recipients have a stake in the objective for which the assistance is given and the responsibility for ensuring that it is used effectively. This does not, of course, absolve the receiving countries from the primary responsibility for implementing the institutional changes required to achieve the necessary reconciliation, reconstruction and development goals. The important contribution that the donors can make lies in the influence that they can exert through the amount of aid that they are prepared to give, the period over which they commit it and the conditions that they attach to it. Each of these can make an important difference to the ultimate success or failure of the assistance.

The events of the conflict in different countries in Africa followed in the implementation of their post-war development programmes, point to several important scenarios and concerns. First, there are crucial inputs and roles that the international community could and should play in order to help weak countries manage their affairs better before, during and after conflict. Indeed, it was the nature and magnitude of the support received from donors that determined, in the short and long run, the post-conflict fortunes. Second, the two civil wars undoubtedly revealed that the processes and stages leading to their outbreak are usually not limited to developments in their domestic environments alone. Third, there is usually wider sub-regional, regional and global dimensions to how conflict break out, how they fester and

314 Borer, T. (2006). ‘Truth Telling as a Peacebuilding Activity: A Theoretical Overview’. In Borer (ed.), *Telling the Truths. Truth Telling and Peace Building in Post-Conflict Societies*. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, pp. 1–58.

how they are eventually concluded, whether effectively or not. This point is even more important in the context of the mixed reactions to the conflicts in Africa, the sub-regional organization that played such a major role at different stages of the conflicts and in their resolution. While some countries, at least publicly, supported the quest for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts, others engaged in both visible and clandestine activities to undermine and subvert the reconstruction efforts.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The study finding raises the imperative for some kind of discretion and self-control on the part of different regimes, as well as a mechanism for imposing peer sanctions on deviant regimes and countries that aid the destabilization of other countries or engaged in acts that subvert the integrity of neighbouring states. There are, accordingly, two frameworks that can provide effective bulwarks to the Marshal Plan implementation in Africa. One such mechanism is the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, a bold attempt to consolidate peace, security and stability in Africa, and to redeem the image of the continent which was badly battered during the civil wars. The second framework, at the broader continental level, is the New Partnership for Africa (NEPAD) Peer Review Mechanism, also adopted by the African Union, which proposes regular reviews and assessments of individual member country's policies in order to forestall situations and conditions that could precipitate instability and breach of domestic and regional peace. There is no doubt that if the guiding principles of these two initiatives are upheld and supported by the signatories, they could form a credible basis for self-introspection, opprobrium and decorum, especially by those member countries that have a tendency to pursue or support policies that create tension and unrest locally and in neighbouring countries.

According to the study findings it is clear that post-conflict in Africa has left in their wake a litany of problems that may be difficult to resolve, even in the long run, due to lack of capacity and resources. Even in Sierra Leone, where the tasks of PCR had the goodwill and active support of the UN and some friendly countries, there is still much to be done in almost all national spheres. Much would therefore depend on whether the African people move on to more constructive engagement among themselves, and between their countries and key countries and institutions around the world. Ultimately, the most important task is for the governments to put their citizens at the centre of whatever PCR agenda is being implemented. After all, that is the only assurance that post-war peace, reconstruction and national reconciliation can take deep roots, be owned and identified with by the people.

In closing, it is appropriate to lay stress on education, as the issue where in important respect all these issues unite. This is true for development, where no more important and productive investment can be made than education, and building of human capital. It also applies to the more specific issue of conflict prevention and building more stable and just societies: social capital, an educated population, offers the best route in that direction. More specifically, the avenue of education also offers exciting opportunities for enhancing broad understanding and skills in civic responsibility and conflict resolution, through schools and universities and

other training programs which aim to develop a range of skills in conflict and dispute resolution.

More studies are needed to explore the potential benefits of indigenous forms of participatory peacemaking and peace building that should emphasize PCR transformation based on a genuine democratically rooted praxis and practice that is equally sensitive to issues of civic empowerment, national ownership, capacity-building at all levels and an equitable and sustainable peace.

PCR, specifically the by adopting the Marshal Plan, is a global necessity which differs in their way of adoption and implementation depending with the worlds continents settings all together. This warrants the need for another study which could ensure generalization of the study findings for all countries that face conflict and are in need of PCR hence pave the way for new policies. The study, therefore, recommends further investigation on the concept of PCR in war torn countries globally.